Giovanni Gentile’s Criticism of Marxism

by Momcilo Nevsky and Zoltanous

In the early stages of Giovanni Gentile's intellectual journey, prior to his identification as the "Philosopher of Fascism," he authored two monographs on Karl Marx's Philosophy in 1897 and 1899. These essays, written shortly after Marx's passing in 1883, demonstrate Gentile's profound comprehension of Philosophy and the prevailing intellectual currents of his time, even at a young age. Gentile's early writings on Marx, much like his other works, have remained untranslated into English until recently.

What makes Gentile's critique of Marx particularly intriguing is the shared intellectual lineage they both hail from, namely German idealism. Both Gentile and Marx possessed a deep understanding of Hegel, while simultaneously harboring criticisms of Hegel and other German idealists. Consequently, Gentile's intellectual grasp of Marx surpasses that of most self-proclaimed anti-Marxists (and, incidentally, many Marxists as well). He does not merey attempt to discredit the Communist manifesto by extolling the supposed virtues of capitalism or cautioning against the perils of "big government." Instead, Gentile engages with Marx on his own terms, effectively exposing the inherent flaws within Marx's philosophical doctrine by referencing Marx's own writings.

It is worth noting that even Vladimir Lenin, in an encyclopedia entry he penned about Marx and Gentile's book, The Philosophy of Marx, in 1914, considered Gentile's work noteworthy and recommended it as supplementary reading. Lenin acknowledged that Gentile's analysis delved into important aspects of Marx's materialist dialectics that were often overlooked by Kantians, Positivists, and others. This commendation occurred despite the encyclopedia entry adopting an interpretation of Marx's epistemology and metaphysics that stood in stark contrast to Gentile's viewpoint. Moreover, Gentile's understanding of Marx is further validated by the fact that many of Marx's manuscripts were unpublished during the late 1800s when Gentile wrote his essays. These manuscripts would only be published in the 1930s through an initiative by the Soviet Union. As we will explore later in this video, the publication of those manuscripts largely vindicated Gentile's interpretation of Marx as a confused neo-Hegelian rather than a vulgar materialist. This serves as a testament to the ironic adage that "Marx was a bad Marxist!"

Now turning to the substance of these essays, Gentile initiates his discussion with an exploration of Marx's philosophy of history, referred to as Historical Materialism in the essay, although it is now commonly known as Dialectical Materialism. At the time, Italian intellectuals, both Marxist and non-Marxist, engaged in a debate about whether Historical Materialism could be classified as a Philosophy of History in the same vein as previous philosophers such as Hegel or Vico.

According to the glossary on the pro-Marxist website Marxists.org, Dialectical Materialism is succinctly summarized with the following quote from Frederick Engels:

"It is an eternal cycle in which matter moves, a cycle that certainly only completes its orbit in periods of time for which our terrestrial year is no adequate measure, a cycle in which the time of highest development, the time of organic life and still more that of the life of being conscious of nature and of themselves, is just as narrowly restricted as the space in which life and self-consciousness come into operation. A cycle in which every finite mode of existence of matter, whether it be sun or nebular vapour, single animal or genus of animals, chemical combination or dissociation, is equally transient, and wherein nothing is eternal but eternally changing, eternally moving matter and the laws according to which it moves and changes.”

— Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature

And the dictionary defines it as:

“The Marxist theory… that political and historical events result from the conflict of social forces and are interpretable as a series of contradictions and their solutions. The conflict is believed to be caused by material needs.”

— Merriam Webster Dictionary

Defining and precisely grasping the term "Historical Materialism" can be a challenging endeavor, compounded by the fact that Marx never explicitly used this term, and Engels himself did not employ it until after it was coined by a fellow Marxist in the later years of Marx's life. This struggle to define and comprehend Historical Materialism was part of the ongoing debate in Italy. The term emerged from a sort of interpretive understanding of Marx and Engels' works, with uncertainties concerning whether Engels truly grasped Marx's intentions. Complicating matters further, much of Marx's elaboration on this topic, albeit tangentially, remained unpublished until the 1930s, unbeknownst to contemporary scholars.

In the Debate on Historical Materialism, Gentile aligns himself with the perspective that Marx's Historical Materialism constitutes a Philosophy of History, akin to Hegel's viewpoint. He agrees with Antonio Labriola, a prominent Italian Marxist of the time, while disagreeing with Bendetto Croce, a leading non-Marxist intellectual and a friend of Gentile's. Croce regarded Historical Materialism merely as economic determinism, which may aid historians in understanding the past but is ultimately inadequate for supporting socialism or guiding practical life. Croce argued that Historical Materialism fails to qualify as a philosophy of history because it solely focuses on explaining the past and neglects considerations of the future.

Gentile's endorsement of Historical Materialism as a philosophy of history rests on two key reasons. Firstly, Marx is viewed as inseparable from his Hegelian heritage, despite his attempts to "correct" and "surpass" Hegel. Marx's theory is fundamentally grounded in the Hegelian view of history. Secondly, Historical Materialism seeks to describe the process by which history unfolds, as a sequence of class or societal contradictions and antagonisms that are eventually resolved. According to Gentile, Historical Materialism does not aim to predict the future in the same way an astronomer predicts an eclipse based on astronomical data. Instead, it provides an account of the unfolding of history, encompassing the past, present, and future. It transcends being merely a historical tool for post-hoc explanations; it encompasses much more.

Gentile counters Croce's claim that Historical Materialism cannot support socialism or serve as a revolutionary philosophy. On the contrary, Gentile asserts that Historical Materialism, when understood correctly, is a revolutionary doctrine that can serve as a rallying cry for communists. While Marx did not develop a specific ethical system for communists to rally around, comparable to Kantian, Christian, or Aristotelian ethics, Historical Materialism does subject ethics and morality to the context of their time. However, this does not diminish their importance. Each "turning point of history," where contradictions are resolved through social change, possesses a morality consistent with its underlying reality. Communism itself is subject to dialectical materialism, wherein ethics emerge as a byproduct of that society. In the case of communism, the ethics of class struggle take precedence since it exists within a particular historical period, striving to establish its own turning point in history, guided by its presently understood ethics.

Gentile writes:     

“Now what does it mean, towards historical materialism, as towards every philosophy of history, that morality is a fact? Fact means history; and history is what historical materialism must study and elucidate, not what it must produce; it is its content, its presupposition, not its product; and what is presupposed cannot be denied. [...]

Thus conceived, historical materialism must account for itself and for the whole of life; and as in life there is the beautiful and the good and the ugly and the bad, it must explain the beautiful and the ugly, and the good and the bad, that is, it must assign them a legitimate place.”

— Giovanni Gentile, The Philosophy of Marx

While Gentile's essay may initially appear to commend Marx and his theories, it becomes clear that Gentile's aim is to salvage what he can from Marx's ideas. He defends Marx against what he perceives as misguided criticisms and seeks to understand Marx on his own terms, even if it deviates from the orthodox Marxist viewpoint. It is only towards the end of the first essay that Gentile begins to critique Marx more directly. Gentile's critique of Historical Materialism is unique in that he agrees with Labriola that it is a philosophy of history, but he finds significant flaws and contradictions within its description of historical unfolding. According to Gentile, Marx's Philosophy of History is derived from Hegel's philosophy of history, but with crucial differences. The main distinction Gentile identifies is that Marx replaces the absolute with the relative, wherein the material world assumes the role of the immaterial mind that creates and forms the basis of reality, as believed by the idealist school to which both Hegel and Gentile belong.

Instead of the mind (or the Absolute) developing dialectically, as in Hegel's philosophy of history, Marx's theory asserts that matter and the empirical world develop dialectically, driving Historical Materialism and the Marxist philosophy of history. However, Gentile argues that the problem lies in making philosophical predictions based on the material world, particularly economic facts in Marx's case. Hegel's historical philosophy works because the absolute or Spirit is not concerned with material reality, as vulgar materialists like Lenin believe, but with the immaterial mind. Hegel discusses the historical development of Spirit, not matter. The absolute is a philosophical concept that permeates all of reality and can thus be the subject of philosophy, explaining its dialectical development. However, when a philosophy describes the projection of the relative, of matter, it becomes akin to an astronomer predicting eclipses and falls short of being a proper philosophy.

A philosophy of history fundamentally relies on making a priori claims about what will happen. However, if these claims are about matter or the relative, they are reduced to historiography and event prediction, lacking the level of metaphysics or philosophy. To achieve metaphysical status in the realm of history, one must rely on something beyond matter that moves it but remains unaffected by it, such as Hegel's absolute. Gentile concludes by denouncing Marx's historical philosophy as "one of the most wretched deviations of Hegelian thought."

Gentile's criticism of historical materialism is damning and distinctive in that he acknowledges Marx's attempt to create a philosophy of history. However, Marx's materialism prevents him from constructing a logical and consistent framework. Marx rejects materialism to some extent in order to embrace idealist principles, but not enough to fully abandon materialism. This leads to philosophical constructs riddled with internal contradictions and logical problems, striving for greatness but ultimately falling short.

It is this perplexing intertwining of idealism and materialism that Gentile scrutinizes in his critique of Marx. As we delve into the second half of Gentile's essay, we witness Marx's fleeting attempt to formulate a coherent philosophy, only to have it marred once again by a subtle undercurrent of materialist metaphysics. Gentile's examination begins with Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, a collection of 11 succinct bullet points that Marx had jotted down for a future project centered around Feuerbach. Alas, this project never came to fruition. The Theses conclude with one of Marx's most renowned quotes, asserting that philosophers have a role not merely to describe the world, but to change it.

To provide some context, Feuerbach, a prominent figure among the Left Hegelians, emerged a generation after Hegel himself. Feuerbach developed a philosophy that was both materialistic and deeply concerned with the human experience. His influence on Marx and Engels is evident, as it is from Feuerbach that they derived the concept of alienation. However, Marx did not hesitate to voice his criticisms of Feuerbach, which we can discern in a rudimentary form within the Theses. Gentile discerns in Marx's critique of Feuerbach's vulgar materialism, which paradoxically exhibits traces of idealism, an inclination towards a philosophy of Praxis. This concept, which Gentile himself would later explore more profoundly within his idealist framework, is not entirely novel to idealism. Gentile traces its origins back to the philosophical teachings of Socrates and Plato. However, he asserts that Praxis takes on a new significance when considered within the realm of materialism. But what, precisely, does Marx's philosophy of Praxis entail?

Praxis, in broad terms, can be defined as "practice, as distinguished from theory." For our purposes, it may be more aptly described as "human activity." It emphasizes the importance of active human engagement, surpassing the realm of mere theoretical contemplation. Marx's philosophy of Praxis aligns with his famous proclamation that philosophers are not mere observers, but agents of change in the world. Gentile perceives promise in Marx's exploration of Praxis, as it resonates with his own idealist convictions. However, he contends that Marx's philosophy of Praxis ultimately succumbs to the influence of materialist metaphysics, perpetuating the confusion between idealism and materialism. This amalgamation, according to Gentile, obstructs the development of a coherent and consistent philosophy in Marx's work.

Gentile writes that:

“In Marx, praxis is synonymous with human sensory activity” Marx’s Praxis is also noteworthy in that it denies other theories that posit the subject and object as two abstract concepts and instead has them “inseparably linked to each other, so that their actual reality results from their relationship to the organism in which and through which they find their necessary fulfillment, and outside of which they are nothing but abstractions.” Gentile elaborates on his interpretation of Marx saying that for him “Reality … is a subjective production of man; a production, however, of sensory activity; not of thought, as Hegel and other idealists believed.”

— Giovanni Gentile, The Philosophy of Marx

In Marx's perspective, praxis refers to the active engagement of human sensory activity, where the process of perceiving stimuli through our senses forms the foundation of our reality. According to Marx, reality is subjective and produced by humans through their sensory activity. While acknowledging the influence of environment and education on human development, Marx emphasizes the crucial aspect that humans have the ability to change their environment and education, highlighting a mutual relationship between the subject (humanity) and the object (environment).

Gentile identifies in Marx's thinking a Hegelian or idealist element, where a dialectical interaction between subject and object occurs, leading to mutual transformation. Marx's conceptualization differs from Fichte's thesis, antithesis, and synthesis framework. For Marx, the thesis becomes the circumstances or environment, the antithesis represents education, and the synthesis emerges as a modified subject. However, despite Marx's rejection of Feuerbach's vulgar materialism, Gentile considers Marx's metaphysics to be a form of "materialistic monism," distinguished by the incorporation of the concept of praxis applied to matter. Marx's metaphysical framework can be understood as Hegelian philosophy viewed through a materialistic lens. Instead of spirit or mind, Marx focuses on the body, and instead of idea, he emphasizes sense. Economic facts, which result from human sensory activity in the pursuit of material needs, replace Hegel's notion of true reality. Marx perceives the external world through the senses, interpreting it as various sensations such as visual, auditory, or tactile experiences. While Marx recognizes the world as composed of matter, his Hegelian background leads him to view matter as dialectically dynamic and constantly changing. This perspective allows Marx to develop a philosophy of history, although it presents logical challenges, as discussed earlier.

Problems arise within this materialistic philosophy with Hegelian characteristics. The philosophy asserts that sense is the principle of reality, and all external information is filtered through our senses, manifesting as sensory data. Gentile poses the question of who provides this external information, suggesting that the sense itself creates the sensation. Beyond the external information, there is only physical fact. The origin of these facts, such as the vibrations of the ether, lies outside the realm of human sensory activity, which Marx considers as the foundation of his metaphysics. In other words, matter exists beyond the scope of sense. This critique reveals that Marx's theory of sensory praxis fails to justify the existence of matter, thereby undermining the entire metaphysical foundation of Marx's thinking.

Gentile further highlights an issue with advocating for the existence of a philosophy of praxis, as it transcends sensible reality by positing something immaterial and metaphysical that cannot be perceived by human senses. Such challenges can be addressed through pure idealism, exemplified by Gentile's later development of Actual Idealism, where a praxis of thinking forms the basis of his metaphysics, and everything becomes a product of the mind. If thought alone is considered real, Gentile eliminates the need to consider what lies beyond the realm of our minds, as the mind itself constitutes reality.

In Gentile's final analysis, he argues that the amalgamation of materialism and idealism in Marx's philosophy is ultimately untenable. Rather than surpassing Hegel, Marx ends up creating a philosophical system that is internally contradictory and incoherent, as it combines elements of idealism and materialism. Gentile asserts that Marx's own standards and mechanisms reveal the philosophical bankruptcy of his system, without the need to delve into historical or economic critiques. Throughout this discussion, I deliberately avoided using the terms "Marxist" or "Marxism" for a specific reason. The ideology that emerged after Marx's death, championed by thinkers like Engels and Lenin, does not align with the interpretation Gentile presents. Gentile perceives Marx as a peculiar fusion of materialism and idealism, while Engels and Lenin primarily focused on Marx's materialistic aspects, neglecting his idealist tendencies.

For example, in Lenin's 1909 book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, which later became mandatory reading in Soviet higher education, he writes that:

“Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e., on matter organised in a definite way. The existence of matter does not depend on sensation. Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product of matter organised in a particular way. Such are the views of materialism in general, and of Marx and Engels in particular.”

— Vladimir Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-criticism

And in the 1914 encyclopedia article where Gentile is referenced, Lenin writes that:

“Marx decidedly rejected, idealism.”

— Vladimir Lenin, A Brief Biographical Sketch With An Exposition of Marxism

Lenin's interpretation of Marx sharply contrasts with Gentile's perspective. Gentile sees Marx as basing his entire metaphysics on the activity of sensation, where the subject and object worlds are dialectically intertwined and cannot exist without each other. In contrast, Lenin attributes to Marx the view that consciousness is the highest product of matter organized in a particular way. However, it is important to note that at the time both Gentile and Lenin were writing, much of Marx's work had not yet been published. It wasn't until the 1930s, under the Soviet Union, that significant works such as the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and The German Ideology were released. The Manuscripts of 1844 specifically reveal the idealistic tendencies Gentile identified in Marx's writings, based on the notes Marx took from Feuerbach. There is no defense of a vulgar or crude materialism, as Lenin would later write about and attribute to Marx himself.

Historian Gareth Stedman Jones supports the idea that Marx's more idealistic side has been suppressed. In his biography on Marx, Jones argues that the newly revealed writings of the young Marx, such as the Theses on Feuerbach, demonstrate that Gentile had a better understanding of Marx than Lenin did.

“According to Engels, [Marx] developed his new ‘materialist conception of history’ between his completion of The Holy Family in the autumn of 1844 and his reunion with Engels in Brussels in the spring of 1845. During these months, Karl did not publish anything. The only piece of relevant documentation, which Engels discovered when going through papers dating from that period, was a two-page entry in one of Karl’s notebooks, entitled Ad Feuerbach.”

— Gareth Stedman Jones, Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion

In his analysis, Marx criticizes the older vulgar materialist schools, contrary to supporting it, similar to Gentile's perspective over a century ago. Jones further explains that this lack of support for the materialism advocated by Engels and Lenin posed a challenge for the Soviet Union. To address this issue in the publication of The German Ideology, Marxist archivist David Riazanov wrote a chapter titled "I. Feuerbach."

“But it has recently been demonstrated that it was ‘factitiously’ put together by Riazanov and his associates in the 1920s. The purpose of its publication during the early years of the Soviet Union was to complete the exposition of ‘Marxism’ as a system by connecting what Karl in 1859 had called a process of ‘self clarification’ with Engels’ claim about Karl’s development of ‘the materialist conception of history’ in 1885.”

— Gareth Stedman Jones, Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion

The Soviet Union even fabricated chapters in an attempt to make it appear that Marx supported vulgar materialism, as advocated by Engels, Lenin and the USSR. This assertion finds additional support in Gentile's interpretation of Marxism, as highlighted in an introduction to the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 written by Italian Marxist Lucio Colletti.

Colletti writes:

“The immediate reasons for the resistances and perplexities they aroused in Marxist circles were certainly of a theoretical nature. It would be needless exaggeration of the case to ascribe the reaction directly to political factors. Nevertheless, the sheer rigidity of official doctrine, the rigor mortis which already gripped Marxism under Stalin, contributed in no small way to the cool reception which the writings met with when they appeared, to the absence of any debate about them, and to the manner in which they were immediately classified and pigeon-holed

What made the [Manuscripts of 1844]  appear so 'out of line' with Marxism was their profound dissimilarity to 'dialectical materialism'. They said nothing at all about the dialectics of nature; nothing which prepared the way for Engels's theory of the three basic dialectical laws of the universe.”

— Lucio Colletti, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844

Colletti also discusses how the East German authorities subtly suppressed the Manuscripts of 1844 by excluding them from the larger volumes of Marx's works and publishing them as separate entities. Lastly, it is worth noting a point made by historian A. James Gregor, which supports the notion that Marx and Engels had differing philosophies that were not entirely in sync with each other.

Gregor writes:

“We do know that Marx did not confide all his opinions to Engels and what the judgment on the epistemology of his compatriot might have been we shall probably never know, since Marx's daughter took it upon herself to destroy her father's correspondence with his wife; a vandalism undertaken in order to avoid "embarrassment" to Engels.”

— A. James Gregor, Giovanni Gentile and The Philosophy of The Young Karl Marx

Based on the evidence presented, it can be argued that Lenin and Engels misinterpreted Marx, and that Gentile's interpretation holds more validity. Gentile's critique of the "real Marx" and not the Marxism as understood through Engels and Lenin seems to resonate, as they appear to have misunderstood Marx in significant ways.

Additionally, it would be prudent to consider the perspectives of the Italian philosopher Diego Fusaro. As a self-proclaimed adherent to the teachings of both Hegel and Marx, Fusaro heralds Gentile as a towering intellectual figure within the Italian philosophical milieu of the twentieth century. In many of his lectures, Fusaro advances a narrative that weaves together Marx with idealism, thereby resonating with the interpretive lens through which Gentile views the philosophical landscape. This alignment lends credence to the dialectical contentions articulated in this article.

Fusaro briefly explaining the idealism of Karl Marx

In conclusion, I will allow Gentile to close this matter off: 

“We will say, therefore, in conclusion, that an eclecticism of contradictory elements is the general character of this philosophy of Marx; of which some of his disciples today are perhaps not greatly wrong in not knowing what to do. There are many fruitful ideas at its foundation, which taken separately are worthy of meditation: but isolated they do not belong, as has been proved, to Marx, nor can they therefore justify that word "Marxism," which is sought to be synonymous with a purely realistic philosophy.”

— Giovanni Gentile, The Philosophy of Marx