In the opening chapter of his renowned book, The Theory of Mind As Pure Act, Giovanni Gentile tackles a common materialist critique he titles "The Subjectivity of The Real." He outlines the materialists' argument that it's easy to conceive of a library, a tree, or various landscapes and structures existing independently of human consciousness. They argue that one can easily envision these entities persisting in the absence of any observer and having existed long before any person ever encountered them. Gentile acknowledges that while this may hold for natural landscapes, man-made constructs like libraries require the touch of human consciousness. Moreover, he notes that certain places on Earth remain untouched by any form of consciousness, human or otherwise. Vast oceanic expanses devoid of life, subterranean realms layered with soil and sand, uninhabited due to extreme temperatures, exemplify areas beyond the reach of living awareness, particularly the Earth's core, which is far too hot for any form of life to endure.
In addressing the critique that uninhabited areas, unseen by any form of consciousness, challenge the validity of idealism, Gentile concedes that one can indeed conceptualize such places without the need for a conscious observer. Yet, he counters this by pointing out the paradox of attempting to imagine the absence of imagination itself. The act of contemplating the existence of something without imagination paradoxically confirms the necessity of imagination in the process. To imagine not perceiving something is, in itself, a form of perception. People often engage in this process, forming mental images of places and things before they experience them firsthand. Gentile then draws upon the thoughts of George Berkeley, an earlier proponent of idealist philosophy, who addressed similar materialist arguments.
Berkeley with his clear insight remarked that:
“There is surely nothing easier than to imagine trees in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody being by to perceive them; but in such case all that we do is to frame in our mind certain ideas, which we call books and trees, and at the same time omit to frame the idea of any one who may perceive them.”
— George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge
Gentile and Berkeley identify what I would call “the materialist contradiction,” which is the paradox of using the concept of consciousness to argue against the necessity of consciousness itself. According to the materialist viewpoint, one can envisage people not envisioning things, which ironically relies on the very faculty of consciousness that they aim to discredit, thus nullifying their own argument. Even when not physically present in a park, a library, or amidst nature like a forest or waterfall, the mere awareness of these entities by a subject indicates that a collective consciousness, not just an individual one, is capable of conjuring such phenomena. Gentile differentiates his stance from both solipsism, which posits the existence of only one's own consciousness, and from a reductive materialist perspective that ignores the collective capacity of consciousness to shape reality. He proposes Actual Idealism, which suggests that the world is shaped by the collective minds of its inhabitants, functioning in a sort of immaterial democracy wherein every consciousness contributes equally to the formation and transformation of reality. In contrast, solipsism offers an amoral, individualistic perspective, recognizing only a single consciousness as valid.
Gentile critiques both materialism and solipsism for their individualistic slant, which neglects the moral and societal implications in favor of a perspective centered around the self. They inadequately address how things come to be and the reality of unseen, uninhabited regions, undervaluing the mind and the power of a collective consciousness in shaping the cosmos. The question arises: if only one consciousness is acknowledged, how do we account for prehistoric events and locations untouched by human awareness? This presents what seems to be a paradox within both solipsism and Gentile's Actual Idealism — if unseen places exist despite the absence of a human observer, how does that align with the idea that consciousness is foundational to reality? Gentile resolves this apparent contradiction by introducing a theistic dimension, positing a divine consciousness — God — as the universal architect, ensuring the existence and continuity of all things, regardless of human perception.
To quote Gentile:
“Berkeley, indeed, even while saying esse est percipi, even while making reality coincide with perception, distinguished between the thought which actually thinks the world, and the absolute, eternal Thought, which transcends single minds, and makes the development of single minds possible. From the empirical point of view, at which, as a pre-Kantian idealist, Berkeley remained, it is obvious, and appears incontrovertible, that our mind does not think all the thinkable, since our mind is a human mind and therefore finite and the minds of finite beings exist only within certain limits of time and space. And then, too, we are able to think there is something which exists, even though actually it may never yet have been thought. It seems undeniable, then, that our mind has not as the present object of its thought everything which can possibly be its object. And since whatever is not an object of human thinking at one definite, historical, empirical, moment, seems as though it may be such an object at another such moment, we come to imagine another thinking outside human thinking, a thinking which is always thinking all the thinkable, a Thought which transcends human thought, and is free from all the limits within which it is or can be circumscribed. This eternal, infinite, thinking is not a thinking like ours which feels its limits at every moment. It is God’s thinking. God, therefore, is the condition which makes it possible to think man’s.”
— Giovanni Gentile, The Theory of Mimd As Pure Act
Gentile's theistic interpretation posits that divine thought underpins the existence of regions in the world devoid of material life, asserting that God's consciousness predated and surpasses ours in both intensity and scope. If human consciousness can be deemed superior to that of an ant or a wolf, then, by such logic, God's consciousness would be exponentially greater than ours, capable of encompassing the entire universe. The solipsistic perspective falls short in this regard, unable to account for realities beyond the individual mind. In contrast, Actual Idealism provides an explanation: reality is indeed a construct of the mind, but not confined to a singular mind. A lone mind cannot grasp the entirety of the world or the galaxy; this understanding requires a collective, a point Gentile shares with the philosophy of Hegel. Gentile critiques materialism for its speculative nature; it proposes that objects can exist without being perceived but lacks the means to confirm this as truth. Materialism suggests a separation between matter and mind, implying that existence does not necessitate perception. Thus, by its own logic, the truth of materialism need not be perceived — and indeed, cannot be verified. If materialism is accurate, its own validity remains unprovable.
Now let me break this down simply. Consider, for a moment (and 'consider' here is crucial in the debate between materialists and idealists), the existence of a planet — our Earth — completely untouched by any form of consciousness. Imagine it as the lone planet in a universe devoid of observers, where time has passed without a single moment of awareness. This planet exists purely by virtue of particles, atoms, and quarks. It is unknown because there is no one to know of it. Objects are present, but there are no subjects to contemplate them. Thus, no speculation or theorizing about its existence can arise from elsewhere, because there simply is nothing else. Materialists might argue that this scenario affirms the supremacy of matter over mind, suggesting that if a planet can indeed exist without being observed, then materialism stands correct. It would imply that matter alone is the source of creation, with consciousness as nothing more than an incidental outcome of physical processes. However, even if this scenario were possible, how could we ever confirm it? I'm not asking whether such a planet exists without observation, or whether a universe completely devoid of consciousness could spring from mere matter. The question is, if this were the case, how could its truth ever be established? If there's no consciousness to witness it, its existence cannot be verified as truth. Conversely, if consciousness is present to observe it, the scenario is instantly invalidated. This is the inevitable conundrum when a philosophy excludes the mind from its framework — if existence doesn't require knowledge to be affirmed, it can't be proven, because proof inherently requires knowledge.
Now, let's flip the script. Suppose idealism holds true. Imagine that, suddenly, we encounter an entity, a structure, or some sort of ethereal construct that possesses no matter at all. Its very existence is sustained solely by consciousness. While we currently have no such entities — all known things in the universe are material — this discovery would support the idealist perspective. There would be a way to validate the truth of idealism, whereas with materialism, even if it were accurate, there would be no method to substantiate it. Gentile emphasizes what is known, not what is unknown. If idealism is factual, it will be within the realm of consciousness. According to its own principles, it ought to be possible to perceive entities that exist purely by being perceived. The opposite scenario — a universe abundant in matter but devoid of witnesses to affirm its reality — is unverifiable. While no definitive conclusions have been reached, Gentile suggests that at least in theory, idealism is capable of being proven, unlike materialism. Materialism relies on conjecture, while idealism engages with the act of acknowledging existence. It echoes the old adage: “seeing is believing.”