Maoist China and Cultural Iconoclasm
by Zoltanous
Reflecting on the tragedies that unfolded under Mao Zedong's communist regime raises numerous unsettling questions. The roots of the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward, with their devastating outcomes, can be linked to Mao's radical ambitions. Yet, it's important to recognize that Mao's ideology was fertilized by a blend of influences from both Chinese heritage and Western intellectuals. One might wonder how the innovative thoughts of Western thinkers managed to imprint themselves on Mao's consciousness, and what motivated him, along with certain segments of the Chinese populace, to dismantle their own philosophical and social frameworks in favor of seemingly discordant Western concepts.
To explore these questions, an examination is required into several areas: the evolution of Chinese philosophical thought after the fall of the imperial system; the push by Western-educated Chinese intellectuals for a new cultural identity and a reimagined China; how the New Culture Movement impacted Mao's thinking; and how Mao's own philosophical contributions related to or diverged from China's traditional philosophical landscape. Mao's adaptation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, combined with selected Western principles, culminated in a doctrine that resonated with the Chinese people. This resonance was achieved through the distortion and exploitation of historical texts, intellectual figures, and cultural channels that had nurtured China's deep-seated cultural and philosophical traditions for centuries.
During their imperial era, the Chinese considered themselves a cultured and sophisticated people, priding themselves on their rich philosophical heritage and well-ordered governance. They held intellectual pursuits in high regard, striving for a life of harmony and contentment, and viewed wealth merely as a means to an end—a facilitator of happiness, rather than an end in itself. The traditional Chinese ethos prioritized mental and spiritual well-being over material accumulation, which was seen as potentially disruptive to personal harmony.
Yet, the material success of Western "barbarians" began to make inroads into China, challenging these traditional values and establishing Western influence within the country. As Western philosophies, scientific discoveries, political thought, and social theories made their way into China, they planted the seeds of cultural transformation. Captivated by these new ideas, Chinese intellectuals sought to incorporate them into their vision for a modernized China. The "New Culture Movement" of the 1910s and 1920s represented a push to revitalize China, shedding its perceived backwardness and positioning it as an equal to the technologically and democratically advanced West. The movement initially called for a radical break from the past, favoring a wholesale adoption of Western democratic and scientific principles.
The conclusion of World War I and the subsequent peace treaties, which sidelined Chinese contributions and interests in favor of Western powers and Japan, sparked the May 4th Movement. Over 3,000 Beijing students protested the Versailles Treaty's decision to award German-held territories in China to Japan. This sense of betrayal by the Western democracies redirected Chinese intellectual fervor away from the Western liberal ideals they once admired. Nevertheless, they remained drawn to certain Western ideologies, notably Marxism and communism, which promised a new framework for understanding and organizing society.
According to Theodore de Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan, and Burton Watson in Sources of Chinese Tradition:
“After the Student Movement of May 4, 1919, two currents of thought, ultra-individualistic liberalism and class-struggle communism, found their way into Chinese academic circles, and later became widespread in the country. On the whole, Chinese academic circles desired to effect a change in our culture, forgetting that it had certain elements which are immutable. With respect to Western theories they imitated only their superficial aspects and never sought to understand their true significance in order to improve China’s national life. The result was that a large number of our scholars and students adopted the superficialities and nonessentials of Western culture and lost their respect for and confidence in our own culture.”
— Theodore de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition
Communism presented itself to Chinese intellectuals as a solution to overcome what they saw as China's outdated state and subordination, especially when contrasted with the encroaching influence of Western nations that were depleting China's storied grandeur. These intellectuals, who had gradually become estranged from China’s traditional values, now found themselves also disenchanted with the ideologies of Western democracies they once held in high regard. The very Western nations once admired were now condemned as deceitful, their democratic ideals unmasked as veneers for imperialistic ambitions. In response, these intellectuals, along with their disillusioned students, gravitated toward Marxism, seeing it as an avenue to discard both the ancestral legacy of China and the oppressive Western influence of their time.
The adoption of Marxism by the Chinese intelligentsia may be interpreted as a shocking act of cultural and spiritual self-mutilation; indeed these very intellectuals had now ignited a spark which would eventually evolve into a towering conflagration that would bring down the very traditions upon which China had stood for millennia and drastically alter the future course of Chinese history. These intellectuals were no longer authentic representatives of the Chinese spirit, on the contrary, they were cosmopolitans through and through (many of whom were educated at Western universities), tearing themselves from their Chinese roots. Their radical aims were inspired by the unfolding of international events, such as that of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The Chinese intellectuals’ enthusiasm for the Bolshevik victory is illustrated in a piece by Li Ta-Chao, a professor and librarian at Peking University, whose radical thought greatly molded the mind of one of his students and assistants at the library, Mao Tse-tung. When speaking of the Bolshevik movement, Li Ta-Chao proudly exclaims that:
“All those dregs of history which can impede the progress of [Bolshevism]—such as emperors, nobles, warlords, bureaucrats, militarism, capitalism—will certainly be destroyed as though struck by a thunderbolt…The bell is rung for humanitarianism! The dawn of freedom has arrived!”
— Li Ta-Chao, speech at the founding of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1921
Chinese intellectuals aimed to emulate the progress and intimidation that the Bolsheviks brought to bear in Russia, hoping to challenge the Western imperialist status quo. Despite their fervor, they overlooked the potentially perilous implications hidden within their own revolutionary zeal. They adopted communism, an ideology foreign to their heritage, believing it would rescue China from derogatory perceptions of incompetence and disorder. Communism, rooted in the idea that economic forces primarily drive social and political shifts, is a culmination of Western philosophical evolution. Notably, it aligns more with Western thought than with the displaced traditional Chinese philosophy due to its focus on economic determinism, its organizational control over large populations, and its materialistic emphasis.
Communism emerged as China's solution to the quandary of its era and a way to reclaim national dignity after enduring the shame of imperial domination. Under communist rule, China aspired to highlight the splendors of its history, positioning ancient Chinese intellectuals as precursors to communist ideology. Ironically, even though communism was a Western creation, its adoption in China was not an olive branch to the West but a tool for global confrontation, positioning China as a formidable power.
This adaptation of Marxism and communism by "New China" mirrors, with necessary changes, the 19th-century imperial strategy of adopting foreign techniques to gain the upper hand over foreigners. To fully grasp the profound transformation that shook the very foundations of Chinese society, one must consider its roots in classic Chinese philosophy and how it relates to modern ideologies. The communist critique of traditional Chinese thought was comprehensive, with early attacks on Confucianism led by figures like Ch’en Tu-Hsiu of the progressive magazine New Youth. Ch'en labeled Confucianism as regressive and stifling to progress and innovation, views that resonated with young students who lacked a deep connection to Confucian traditions. This sentiment fueled protests where students vociferously denounced Confucianism, calling for the dismantling of the ancient philosopher's legacy.
In 1935, Sa Meng-Wu, Ho Ping-Sung, and eight other intellectuals published a Declaration For Cultural Construction on a Chinese Basis, outlining a vision for a new Chinese cultural identity. They emphasized the need to critically evaluate their cultural legacy, keeping what was valuable and discarding any detrimental aspects, while also selectively integrating Western cultural elements. However, this approach was deemed too conservative by Hu Shih of the "New Culture Movement," who believed that the foundation of Chinese culture lay with the people, and that there was no harm in completely overhauling the old culture. He insisted that despite any radical changes, the essence of Chinese identity would remain intact, ensuring that any new cultural developments would still be inherently Chinese. This debate between preserving select cultural aspects and complete cultural reinvention foreshadowed the extreme transformations of the Cultural Revolution.
The Communist movement in China was largely driven by intellectuals rather than by workers or peasants. Marx and Engels' Communist ideology, with its Western origins, provided a lens which prioritized economic and material analysis, potentially obscuring the spiritual and philosophical dimensions of life. After 1949, Chinese philosophy began to align closely with the thought of Mao Zedong, influenced by radical reformers like Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and Hu Shi. Mao's key philosophical contributions, such as On Practice and On New Democracy, framed the role of philosophy in the new China and foreshadowed the fate of traditional Chinese philosophy. Mao's philosophy, emphasizing the unity of knowledge and action, was not entirely foreign to traditional Chinese thought, reflecting a continuity with ancient philosophical principles amidst revolutionary change.
In On Practice, Mao illustrates his guiding principle by appealing to an epistemological framework:
“Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing.”
— Mao Zedong, On Practice
When examining the substance and footnotes of On Practice, one soon discovers that Mao spills little ink on the significance of “knowing and doing” in the works of traditional Chinese thinkers like Confucius. On the contrary, traditional Chinese thought is entirely overlooked in the treatise and is instead made up for by Mao’s frequent appeals to non-Chinese intellectuals such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.
There are, however, several instances in the text wherein Mao haphazardly includes several “old Chinese sayings” and a couple of allusions to historical examples of what he understands to be the Chinese people’s “perceptual knowledge” of imperialism transforming into “rational knowledge” of imperialism—an epistemological model which he considers to be evidence that legitimizes his dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge and reality. For the first stage, Mao cites the “anti-foreign struggles” of the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Uprising; for the second stage, Mao claims that the May 4th Movement of 1919 was the period wherein the Chinese masses discovered the “internal and external contradictions of imperialism and saw the essential truth that imperialism had allied itself with China's comprador and feudal classes to oppress and exploit the great masses of the Chinese people.” In the former stage, Mao’s superficial analysis of these historical events fails to account for innumerable complexities and nuances in the social, spiritual, and cultural milieu at the time of their unfolding. In the latter stage, Mao’s analysis may be more consistent with what manifested in actuality; however, this by no means absolves Mao of his post hoc ergo proper hoc conclusions. In short, Mao contorts and truncates these seismic events in Chinese history into a grand narrative that conforms to his dialectical-materialist view of reality; he then appeals to the events (after being conditioned by a dialectical-materialist framework) as being vindications of his brand of dialectical-materialism, thus begging the question.
One of the most fascinating elements of Mao’s thought was his “extraordinary emphasis on the role of human consciousness in the making of history.” Furthermore, although Mao’s brand of dialectical-materialism “paid ideological deference to the presumably “objective laws” of historical development set forth in orthodox Marxist texts, [Mao] clearly believed that the course of history ultimately was determined by what people thought...” Related to the central role of consciousness in historical development are traces of idealism that manifest themselves in several of Mao’s speeches; namely his assertions that mental force or consciousness alone has the capacity to alter or change the development and outcome of physical affairs. This dynamism of mind to matter and matter to mind seems to depart from any kind of coherent materialist or idealist monism. In fact, a kind of dualism emerges. Mao’s thought reflects elements found in that of Lenin, who in turn furthered the brand of materialism advocated within Marx’ own oeuvre—which happened to be a materialist inversion of the absolute idealism of Hegel. The arduous struggles endured on the “Long March” provided Mao with evidence for his theory of “consciousness” and its power to navigate and transform a world of physical objects. Mao explicitly addresses this in his May 1963 speech, Where do Correct Ideas Come From?, wherein he makes the following remarks:
“Furthermore, the one and only purpose of the proletariat in knowing the world is to change it. Often, correct knowledge can be arrived at only after many repetitions of the process leading from matter to consciousness and then back to matter… [M]atter can be transformed into consciousness and consciousness into matter… such leaps are phenomena of everyday life.”
— Mao Zedong, On Practice
In On Practice, Mao seemingly contradicted his prior belief that consciousness and all its derivatives—thoughts, ideas, impressions, theories—are constrained by material reality. Mao had previously aligned with the vulgar materialist view that matter shapes and limits consciousness. This view echoes Lenin's assertion that the core of materialism lies in acknowledging the existence of an external world, independent of our perception.
Yet, we are left puzzling over how Mao’s staunch support for dialectical materialism and its epistemological principles aligns with his later notions that hint at idealism, especially the idea that consciousness has transformative power, as seen after the experiences of "The Long March." Mao shifted the focus of philosophical exploration from abstract theorizing and subjectivism to the resolution of tangible issues, arguing that practice is the sole valid means to gain and apply knowledge. He dismissed metaphysical contemplation as counterproductive and insisted on the synthesis of knowledge and action, underlining the importance of integrating philosophy with practical endeavors. This was part of an effort to reshape existing philosophy to fit the Marxist mold. The transformation of Chinese philosophy under Maoist rule was a topic addressed by Wing-tsit Chan, a former professor of Chinese philosophy at Dartmouth College, in 1961.
“What is the future of Chinese philosophy? In fact, research on Chinese philosophy is going on. Studies and commentaries on Chinese philosophical classics are being published. It can be said, however, that its fate is the same as that of philosophy in general, namely, that it must be reconstructed according to the Marxist pattern.”
— Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book In Chinese Philosophy
Wing-Tsit Chan's writing reveals a certain degree of empathy for the revolutionary changes, portraying the shift in Chinese philosophy in a somewhat favorable light. He perceives this transformation as a self-aware evolution, moving from lofty idealism and abstract concepts toward a focus on concrete, practical concerns that serve the interests of the Chinese populace. Despite some hesitance, Wing-Tsit even categorizes Confucius, Chu Hsi, Wang Yang-ming, and others as "feudalists," though he acknowledges their dedication to solving pragmatic societal issues. On a wider cultural and philosophical spectrum, the Chinese philosopher Hsiao Sha-Fu stressed the importance of creating a fusion or a Chinese adaptation of Western Marxist ideology, tailoring it to form a coherent philosophical framework that aligns with Chinese thought.
Wing-Tsit writes:
“The profound studies and classical criticism of European philosophy by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are forever models in our study. Especially are the philosophical writings of comrade Mao Tse-t'ung and his comrades-in-arms most glorious examples showing us how to continue our philosophical heritage and to unify Marxian philosophy and the Chinese people’s good traditions of thought.”
— Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book In Chinese Philosophy
In On New Democracy, one of his subsequent publications, Mao outlines a blueprint for reshaping culture and philosophy in the "New China." He poses a rhetorical question, "What type of national culture do we aspire to create?" Mao responds to this inquiry from a Marxist perspective, offering his vision of what this culture should encompass:
“A reflection of the politics and economics of a given society, and the former in turn has a tremendous influence and effect upon the latter; economics is the base and politics the concentrated expression of economics…It follows that the form of culture is first determined by the political and economic form, and only then does it operate on and influence the given political and economic form.”
— Mao Zedong, On Contradiction
Hsiao Sha-Fu and Ai Siqi, two Chinese Marxist philosophers, agreed that Mao's idea of integrating Western Marxist theory with Eastern practical application could be realized by critically examining China's cultural legacy through the lens of Marxist-Leninist methodologies. Ai Siqi maintained that it was essential to distill the essence of Chinese culture while discarding its less valuable aspects. Ai Siqi goes on to clarify his position and asserts his final judgment with conviction:
“What is its quintessence? It is that part of the heritage that is democratic, scientific, and for the masses. What are the dregs? They are what is anti-democratic, anti-scientific, and anti-people, or aristocratic. The culture we want to build up is that which is nationalistic, democratic, scientific, and for the masses. Therefore, what we want to continue is that in the old culture which is democratic, scientific, and for the masses, and we must throw away what is anti-democratic, anti-scientific, and anti-people. This should be the general attitude of Marxists-Leninists toward cultural heritage. This is a universal principle.”
— Ai Siqi, How to Carry Out a Criticism of The Culture of The Old Society
Mao addresses the transformation of culture with an outline that is somewhat broad, suggesting the removal of the old economic and cultural systems to make room for "the new politics, the new economy, and the new culture of the Chinese nation." There is a discernible note of prudence in his language, and he seeks to elaborate on his assertion that the old culture needs to be eradicated. This is reflected in his proposed strategy for cultivating a "new culture," as well as in his considerations for the destiny of China's "ancient culture."
Mao states that:
“To throw away its feudal dross, and to absorb its democratic essence [are] necessary condition[s] for the development of our new national culture and for the increase of our national self-confidence; but we should never absorb anything and everything un- critically. We must separate all the rotten things of the ancient feudal ruling class from the fine ancient popular culture that is more or less democratic and revolutionary in character…we must respect our own history and should not cut ourselves adrift from it. However, this respect for history means only giving history a definite place among the sciences, respecting its dialectical development, but not eulogizing the ancient while disparaging the modern, or praising any noxious feudal element.”
— Mao Zedong, The Problem of Culture and Cultural Revolution
Mao's stance towards Confucius is complex and full of paradoxes, exhibiting a spectrum of reactions that oscillate between understanding and aversion. British author and professor Robert Payne, who interviewed Mao in 1946, observed that Confucian thought had left a significant imprint on Mao, despite Mao's admission, "I hated Confucius from the age of eight." This strong aversion is not merely anecdotal; it permeates Mao's writings, where he underscores the need to venerate Confucius and engage with classical texts, while simultaneously arguing that the old customs of etiquette (li) and the traditional approaches to education and philosophy are remnants of China's semi-feudal past that must be discarded.
In a twist, Raya Dunayevskaya, the American founder of Marxist Humanism, critiqued Mao's engagement with Confucianism in her 1957 work, Marxism and Freedom, describing it as a "perversion."
She elaborates in her book:
“So permeated to the marrow of his bones is Mao with Confucianism that it is doubtful he is even conscious that he is thereby perverting in toto the Hegelian-Marxian theory of development through contradiction.”
— Raya Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom
Addressing Mao's proclaimed "hatred" towards Confucius, we revisit Mao's cultural attitudes to find a clear antagonism towards traditional Chinese philosophy, culture, and practices, as conveyed in a communication with the French Foreign Minister, Andre Malraux.
In that message, Mao states that:
“The thought, culture, and customs which brought china to where we found her [in 1949] must disappear, and the thought, customs, and culture of proletarian China, which do not yet exist, must appear.”
— Mao Zedong, Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art May 1942
This implies that even Confucianism, which Mao felt was deeply ingrained in him, would need to be dismantled because, as Mao himself articulated, Confucianism is part of China’s “semi-feudal culture” that warranted subversion. Perhaps there were "democratic" and "revolutionary" aspects within Confucian doctrine that might be preserved. Moreover, Mao was not one to eschew "absolute" truths. In his various texts, he affirmed without reservation that dialectical materialism is "universally true," claiming it was inescapable in practice. Mao similarly hailed Marxism as a "universal truth" on multiple occasions in On New Democracy. Such categorical statements might have drawn criticism from Confucius, who stood firmly against dogmatism and never professed to have a monopoly on absolute truth.
In spite of the drive for cultural revolution, the communist leadership sought to maintain elements of Chinese heritage within their version of communism, presumably to avoid alienating the masses. It could be argued that "the Chinese Communists were too astute to completely discard China's cultural heritage." Cultural expressions like theater, plays, and literature were repurposed as instruments of public "re-education," morphing all facets of social life to fit within a Marxist framework aligned with Mao's revolutionary objectives. Thus, these bastions of culture became arenas for revolutionary transformation, with playwrights not only crafting new works but also adapting and "reforming" old favorites to fulfill this new role. Reports indicated that even ancient literature was being re-edited, and archaeological findings reinterpreted through a Marxist lens.
In a similar vein of utilizing historical roots to inform the current ideology, Liu Shao-ch’i, who served as Vice-Chairman of the Communist party of China and later as Chairman of the People's Republic of China, penned the influential text How To Be a Good Communist. This work weaves together foundational Chinese communist principles with selected references to Confucius, Mencius, and other historical Chinese philosophers. Liu did not denounce these philosophical figures; rather, he leveraged their stature to reinforce communist ideology. His inclusion of traditional Chinese philosophy underscores a strategic decision to create a sense of continuity within Chinese thought. Mao himself echoed this approach, rejecting the idea that a foreign culture would supplant the old, as he stated:
“China has suffered a great deal from the mechanical absorption of foreign material. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula…Chinese culture should have its own form, its own national form. National in form and new-democratic in content—such is our new culture today.”
— Mao Zedong, Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art May 1942
This "blending" extended beyond the assimilation of external concepts, also encompassing elements from traditional Chinese customs and culture that could be selectively preserved and integrated.
“To make clear the process by which this traditional culture developed, to discard its feudal residue, and to absorb its democratic essence, are necessary steps for developing our new national culture and heightening our national self-confidence. This assimilation, however, must never be uncritical. We must carefully distinguish between those completely rotten aspects of the old culture that were linked with the feudal ruling class, and the excellent popular culture, which was more or less democratic and revolutionary in character.”
— Mao Zedong, Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art May 1942
Making these distinctions was far from straightforward, particularly when the goal was to retain aspects of China's cultural legacy.
Conclusions
In 1953, Dr. H.G. Creel, a scholar of Chinese philosophy from the University of Chicago, embarked on a study to examine the impact of communist ascendancy on the mindset of the broader Chinese populace. Four years into communist governance, Creel observed some evident trends concerning the contemporary Chinese mentality. For instance, he pointed out that Mao Zedong's declarations appeared atypically non-Chinese in their essence. The ideological structure was predominantly Marxist, with occasional references to Chinese culture that seemed somewhat forced, perhaps to mitigate the perception of the writings as too foreign.
Creel highlighted the tools employed by the communist regime, such as the widespread "re-education" initiatives and revolutionary "study groups," where countless individuals spent considerable time daily engrossed in the works of Marxist theorists like Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Zedong. Creel underscored the dramatic shift in children's attitudes towards their parents, pointing out that filial piety, once a core value of Chinese culture, was being undermined. In traditional China, the idea of children testifying against their parents was not only taboo but also a legal offense. The establishment of public "mass trials" and other propaganda mechanisms, however, encouraged young people to renounce long-standing traditions of filial respect by publicly accusing their parents, thus affirming their allegiance to the communist cause. These changes signify a profound, if not tectonic, upheaval of age-old Chinese customs, arguably a consequence of the insidious influence of Mao's ideology and the introduction of Marxism and communism into Eastern society.
More than four decades after Mao's death, his profound influence still casts a spectral presence over various facets of China, including its people, culture, economy, government, and social structure. His blend of Marxism, communism, radicalism, iconoclasm, and philosophical synthesis has left an indelible impact on the Chinese ethos. Yet, Mao's worldview and his grandiose plans were not born in isolation; they were the culmination of the aspirations of a radical Chinese intellectual vanguard that preceded him. These aspirations, once dormant, were brought to fruition under Mao's leadership, resulting in a profound cultural and spiritual upheaval that fragmented a civilization with thousands of years of rich heritage. This upheaval dismantled longstanding traditions, artifacts, and philosophical insights of a storied people. Following Mao's passing, it was Deng Xiaoping who built upon Mao's legacy, steering China towards the formation of the modern state we recognize today.