Nazi and Communist Collaboration: When East and West Meet

by Zoltanous

In the period spanning the 1920s to the 1940s, a fascinating yet frequently underemphasized element emerged in the form of partnerships between the Nazi regime and Soviet communism. Although this alliance is typically minimized by adherents of Marxism-Leninism and modern neo-fascist groups, ample historical records indicate that such connections did exist as cooperative arrangements. Yet, the persistent dismissal of these ties prompts inquiry into the motivations behind ignoring the available proof. Both structured leftist organizations and contemporary extremist nationalists might find discomfort in acknowledging shared traits between the Nazis (NSDAP) and Bolshevism, contributing to a shortfall in thorough scholarly examination of the facts. Thankfully, Nevin Gussack has thoroughly chronicled this overlooked chapter in his detailed volume, When Brown Meets Red: Nazi-Communist Collaboration 1919-1945.

This naturally invites exploration into the primary areas of disagreement between the two systems. One key divide centered on the methods for achieving socialist goals: gradual integration versus abrupt upheaval. The Nazis leaned toward incremental adjustments and incorporation into existing structures, in contrast to the communists’ advocacy for swift, forceful transformations. A further critical divergence involved the emphasis on ethnicity in constructing societal frameworks. The Nazis integrated racial hierarchies closely with socioeconomic strata, while communists elevated class-based economics above ethnic considerations. Nevertheless, both doctrines stood united in their rejection of unregulated capitalist economies and parliamentary systems seen in nations such as the United States and Great Britain, along with moderate socialist variants like those embodied by Germany’s Social Democratic party (SPD).

Tracing roots further back into the 1800s, interactions between Germany and the Russian Empire, later the Soviet Union, involved sporadic joint efforts in defense and commerce. Entrepreneurs and military personnel from Germany worked alongside their Soviet peers, including the exchange of sensitive data that countered the aims of Western nations. The Soviet intelligence’s fourth division maintained tight coordination with Germany’s Reichswehr spy network on mutual priorities, sharing updates on international armed forces advancements. Moreover, German business leaders cultivated commercial relationships with the Soviet state, seeing it as a promising outlet for their products and expertise.

“Along with the Communist Party, the German industrialists were the chief lobbyists for trade between Moscow and Berlin. The Germans exported machinery and goods necessary for the Soviet production of tanks, airplanes, and poison gas. In return, The Soviets allowed their territory to be used by the Reichswehr in exercises hidden from the Allied observers.”

— Nevin Gussack, When Brown Meets Red: Nazi-Communist collaboration 1919-1945

The partnerships between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union penetrated profoundly into defense, trade, and governance arenas throughout the years between the world wars, expanding upon prior connections between Germany and the emerging Soviet entity. In 1922, these countries formalized the Rapallo Treaty, which reestablished formal ties, waived land disputes, and promoted business interactions. This accord enabled two marginalized powers — Germany reeling from its loss in the First World War and the Soviet Union shunned post-Bolshevik uprising — to circumvent the constraints set by the Versailles Treaty and dominant Western entities. Through Rapallo, Germany offered specialized knowledge and manufactured items to the Soviets, whereas the USSR delivered natural resources and concealed venues for German defense enhancements. This arrangement set the stage for hidden military partnerships lasting from 1922 until 1933, during which the German Reichswehr and the Red Army participated in combined drills and technological swaps to upgrade their respective militaries. In exchange, Soviet commanders received discreet instruction at German war colleges, creating a reciprocal benefit that strengthened the defense prowess of each nation.

“The Rapallo Treaty also provided diplomatic cover for cooperation in military matters which allowed Germany to rapidly rebuild its military strength in Russia. It built a flying school at Lipetsk, a chemical weapons factory at Volsk, and two factories for tanks in Moscow and Rostov-on-Don. In return, German banks offered credit to Russia so that it could buy military and industrial machines. Russia could also export its vast quantities of grain. Due to its secrecy, the treaty signed at Rapallo caught all of the nations in Genoa off guard. That conference collapsed with the British and the French condemning the secret treaty of Rapallo.”

— Kurt Readmam, The Treaty of Rapallo: How Russia Rebuilt Germany’s Military

Central to this concealed partnership were undisclosed bases within the Soviet Union, enabling Germany to sidestep Versailles-imposed caps on its armed forces. For example, the Lipetsk flight academy (founded in 1925) served as a site where German aviators practiced on prohibited planes, with both parties trading aeronautical innovations. The Kama armored training center near Kazan permitted German leaders to refine tactics for mechanized combat, influencing the eventual Blitzkrieg strategy, as the Soviets absorbed knowledge on vehicle engineering. Furthermore, the Tomka site for chemical arms near Volsk supported collaborative tests with toxic agents, outlawed by Versailles.

These initiatives not only revitalized Germany’s defense infrastructure but also aided the Soviets in advancing their military production, with German specialists contributing to Soviet plants manufacturing armored vehicles, aircraft, and heavy weapons. Commercial bonds thrived too: Enterprises such as Krupp and Junkers committed resources to Soviet ventures, shipping equipment vital for Stalin’s industrialization drives in return for petroleum, ore, and foodstuffs. These links endured amid underlying philosophical frictions, propelled by joint resentment toward Western influences and practical necessities.

“The Soviet-German pact allowed Germany to rebuild its military and develop new technologies, while the Soviet Union received vital assistance.”

— Ian Ona Johnson, Sowing The Wind: The First Soviet-German Military Pact and The Origins of World War II

A more precise characterization of Hitler’s stance toward the Soviet Union and the German Communist party (KPD) would be one of ambivalence, blending attraction and aversion. Although Hitler dismissed Marxism’s exclusive focus on class, he valued the intense zeal and combativeness displayed by German communists. During the Nazi party’s formative phase, Hitler publicly voiced his respect for communist elements before crowds in Germany. Amid internal party conflicts in 1920, Hitler remarked that he would rather face execution in a Bolshevik-led Germany than thrive in a France-dominated state. At a gathering in Munich in February 1921, Hitler declared his preference for arming communists with half a million weapons over allowing them to reach the Weimar authorities.

Hitler Speaks provided one of the most in-depth accounts of Hitler’s respect for specific communist attributes.

“It is not Germany that will turn Bolshevist, but Bolshevism that will become a sort of National Socialism. Besides, there is more that binds us to Bolshevism than separates us from it…”

— Adolf Hitler, quoted in Hitler Speaks by Hermann Rauschning

Hitler’s Second Book also shows similar views, validating Rauschning here:

“However it is conceivable that in Russia itself, an inner change within the Bolshevik world could take place. Insofar as the Jewish element could perhaps be forced aside by a more or less Russian national one. Then it could also not be excluded that the present real Jewish capitalist bolshevik Russia, could be driven to nationalist anti-capitalist tendencies.”

— Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Second Book

Hitler further admitted to Rauschning that he borrowed his techniques for spreading messages and rallying crowds from communists and radical wings of the Social Democrats. He implied that Marxism might have transformed into something akin to National Socialism if it had shed its commitments to democratic ideology.

““‘I have learned a great deal from Marxism,’ I do not hesitate to admit,’ Hitler went on. ‘I don’t mean their tiresome social doctrine or the materialist conception of history, or their absurd ‘marginal utility’ theories and so on. But I have learned from their methods. The difference between them and myself is that I have really put into practice what these peddlers and pen-pushers have timidly begun. The whole of National Socialism is based on it. Look at the workers’ sports clubs, the industrial cells, the mass demonstrations, the propaganda leaflets written specifically for the comprehension of the masses; all these new methods of political struggle are essentially Marxist in origin. All I had to do was to take over these methods and adapt them to our purpose. I had only to develop logically what Social Democracy repeatedly failed in because of its attempt to realize its evolution within the framework of democracy. National Socialism is what Marxism might have been if it could have broken its absurd and artificial ties with a democratic order.’

‘But surely,’ I objected, ‘what you are describing is not distinct from the Bolshevism and Communism of Russia.’ ‘Not at all!’ Hitler cried. ‘You are making the usual mistake. What remains in Russia is a revolutionary will will’ I inquired. ‘And what is the aim of this revolutionary will?’ I inquired. ‘Power,’ said Hitler simply.’”

— Adolf Hitler, quoted in The Voice of Destruction by Hermann Rauschning

However, the quotes above from Rauschning‘s two books. I must point out that Rauschning, had a tendency to distort many details, as he was a resentful traitor akin to Otto Strasser. Despite this, these quotes, which should be approached with caution, align with much of the more reliable source material I rely on, suggesting they could potentially be validated as true.

Pioneering extremists within the Nazi movement, including those with prior leftist affiliations, exhibited esteem for communism. Initial creators of the Nazi organization, such as Anton Drexler and Karl Harrer, positioned the NSDAP as a leftist entity. In April 1923, the Volkischer Beobachter compared Hitler to Germany’s equivalent of Lenin. Theo Habicht, acting as one of Hitler’s operatives in Austria, had a background in communism. Drexler opined that Marxists could transition seamlessly into Nazis. Roland Freisler, who oversaw the Nazi judicial tribunals, had functioned as a Soviet official in Ukraine around 1920 and held the USSR in high regard. Dietrich Eckart and Gottfried Feder actively sought out communists in Nuremberg to enlist in the Nazis during autumn 1919. Eckart commended communists for their idealistic drive, dedication to collective welfare, and role in Germany’s revival. In his piece German and Jewish Bolshevism, Eckart pushed for a distinctly German form of Bolshevism that would require affluent individuals to relinquish gains to the state.

Numerous regional Nazi leaders and ideological architects, including Gregor Strasser, Joseph Goebbels, and Erich Koch, were vocal proponents of the Soviet Union. Erich Koch, a prominent Nazi administrator, confessed that without meeting Hitler, he might have passionately adopted communism. In his 1934 publication Aufbau im Osten, Koch emphasized how the emerging socialist societies in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were poised to define Europe’s and the globe’s trajectory. Nazi agriculture official Herbert Backe lauded Soviet authorities for their skill in coordination and execution, specifically naming Lenin, Rykov, Chicherin, Krylenko, and Dzherzhinsky as exemplary.

On multiple occasions, other key Nazis displayed respect for the Soviets and their local communist equivalents in Germany. Among the most prominent was Joseph Goebbels, who revered aspects of Bolshevism and even indicated his readiness to fall alongside it:

“It would be better for us to go down with Bolshevism than live in eternal slavery under capitalism.”

— Joseph Goebbels, quoted in The Devil’s Disciples: Hitler’s Inner Circle by Anthony Read

“That is why we place ourselves alongside Russia as equal partners in the struggle for this freedom which means everything to us.”

— Joseph Goebbels, quoted in Goebbels by Georg Reuth

“According to Goebbels, no czar had understood the Russian people’s nationalist instincts as well as Lenin, who, in contrast to the German Communists, was not an internationalist Marxist.”

— Georg Reuth, Goebbels

“Lenin was the greatest man, second only to Hitler... the difference between Communism and the Hitler faith is very slight...“

— Joseph Goebbels quoted in Hitlerite Riot In Berlin: Beer Glasses Fly When Speaker Compares Hitler and Lenin by The New York Times

In the January 1926 issue of Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, he suggested that eradicating Soviet Russia would extinguish the vision of a National Socialist Germany, as noted in Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn’s Leftism Revisited: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Marcuse. In 1925, he pointed out Lenin’s rejection of Marx in favor of Russia’s liberation, noting Lenin’s profound grasp of the populace’s hardships and patriotic drives, surpassing any monarch, per Nikolai Tolstoy’s Stalin’s Secret War.

“The Fuehrer thinks that Bolshevism is the state organization corresponding to Slavism today […] Stalin is a modern Ivan the Terrible or for my sake [sic!] also a Peter the Great.”

— Joseph Goebbels, January 12, 1940

This opportunistic alignment with leftist causes reflected broader sympathies within early Nazi circles for certain aspects of Bolshevism, particularly its emphasis on discipline, military prowess, and anti-Versailles defiance. Commanders in the SA and former Freikorps units openly admired the Soviet Union and the Red Army’s ruthless effectiveness. Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, a onetime Freikorps fighter who later led SA operations in western Germany, praised Russia’s strategy of overwhelming the enemy through continuous attack, terror, and brutality until complete submission. Manfred von Killinger, another Freikorps veteran, called his comrades “right-wing Bolsheviks”; his unit had even fought alongside the Red Army during the 1920 campaign against Poland.

Many early Nazis had roots in leftist or revolutionary movements. Waffen-SS commander Sepp Dietrich began as chairman of a soldiers’ council in November 1918. Economic theorist Gottfried Feder initially supported Kurt Eisner’s Bavarian Soviet Republic that same month. Julius Schreck, Hitler’s longtime driver, served in the short-lived German “Red Army” in Munich in April 1919. Hermann Esser, a core Hitler ally and party propagandist, emerged from Social Democratic ranks. Rudolf Hess himself, in 1920, advocated a German–Soviet rapprochement based on raw materials trade, joint opposition to the Versailles Treaty, and admiration for the Red Army’s restoration of order. He even downplayed reports of Bolshevik atrocities.

Even Alfred Rosenberg, a fervent opponent of Bolshevism within the Nazis, was said to have been intrigued by the nascent Soviet regime. Journalist William Shirer asserted that Rosenberg was in Moscow amid the Bolshevik takeover and considered enlisting with the revolutionaries. But Rosenberg’s enthusiasm diminished upon perceiving Soviet communism as an instrument of a supposed global Jewish plot. Still, with Stalin’s ascent and the respect some key Nazis held for the Soviet ruler, Rosenberg temporarily adjusted his position. In 1929, his outlet Weltkampf voiced support for Stalin’s anti-Jewish leanings and claimed the USSR had escaped Jewish dominance. Yet, by the following decade, Rosenberg reverted to his public views due to the war, meaning that the Germans thought Bolshevism was no longer Jewish by the time they invaded and that it was really war propaganda only idiots today believe.

Concerning claims of Soviet monetary aid to the Nazis, suggestions persist that Stalin covertly bolstered the NSDAP in Weimar-era votes to erode the SPD and incite disorder. Reports indicate Stalin encouraged German General Kurt von Schleicher in 1930 to direct resources toward the Nazis before the Reichstag polls, with the goal of restoring the anti-Western pact from the 1922 Rapallo agreement. Comparable accusations apply to the 1932 contests, where Soviet meddling purportedly amplified Nazi advances during financial distress. Nonetheless, these ideas continue to spark debate and do not enjoy broad validation in standard historical narratives, frequently interpreted as components of wider Soviet tactics to capitalize on German fractures rather than outright financing.

“By the early 1930s, the Soviets banked on the looming possibility that the Nazis would take power in Germany by virtue of their numerical strength; their appeals to extreme nationalism; and a continued adherence to an unorthodox brand of socialism that was against capitalism. The Soviets believed that the Germans would concentrate their war planning against the West and maintain the traditional friendly relations with Moscow. Stalin noted in a conversation with the top German Communist Heinz Neumann at the end of 1931: ‘Don’t you believe, Neumann, that if the Nationalists seize power in Germany they will be so completely preoccupied with the West that we’ll be able to build up socialism in peace?’ In July 1932, the co-founder of the German Embassy in Moscow, Gustav Hilger held discussions with the head of TASS, Jacob Dzhugashvili. Dzhugashvili noted to Hilger ‘his conviction that healthy political common sense would win out in a National Socialist government; even the Nazis would be sensible and would continue a policy toward Russia that, in his opinion, was consonant with the long-range interests of Germany.’ Hilger later recalled that ‘The general impression in the German Embassy was that the Soviet government would have liked to establish contact with the National Socialists for the purpose of preventing such temporary difficulties.’

Stalin’s friendly sentiments to the Nazis even allegedly translated into funding for Hitler’s movement. According to the German military industrialist Arnold Rechberg, Stalin urged Reichswehr General Kurt von Schleicher to provide massive funds to the National Socialists for their campaign during the 1930 Reichstag elections. Stalin believed this funding would re-establish the anti-Western German-Soviet alliance of the Rapallo period. General von Schleicher recalled that ‘Stalin let me know that the situation was becoming more and more ripe for Russia and Germany (in 1930), since France and England neglected their armaments in their silly confidence in the League of Nations. But in order to achieve an active German-Russian policy, a rapid rearmament of Germany was necessary. I, General von Schleicher, had to start a campaign to that effect in Germany; and he, Stalin, believed that Hitler was the man suitable for that purpose. Therefore, the Reichswehr ought to finance Hitler.’”

— Nevin Gussack, When Brown Meets Red: Nazi-Communist Collaboration 1919-1945

A piece in Goebbels’ publication Der Angriff from July 1931 noted Stalin’s use of patriotic and anti-capitalist tactics in carrying out the initial Five-Year Plan. From Der Angriff’s viewpoint, Stalin’s Soviet Union was advancing toward a form of National Socialism:

“The public bankruptcy of the communist idea… Marxism too in the form of the Russian experiment is at an end-we National Socialists however stand at the beginning and Stalin’s speech proves anew that we are in the right.”

— Joseph Goebbels, quoted in Blood and Soil by Anna Bramwell

Inside Germany, the Nazi party and the KPD often engaged in strategic teamwork during the Weimar Republic’s waning phase to erode the democratic state. Both radical flanks regarded the moderate Social Democrats as their chief adversary — the KPD branded them “social fascists” following Stalin’s orders, rejecting any coalition against fascism until opportunities had vanished. A striking instance was the 1932 Berlin transit walkout, where Nazis and communists coordinated labor actions against the SPD-dominated administration, halting urban transportation and sowing disorder to weaken Weimar’s legitimacy.

“Other Communist and Nazi leaders admitted their willingness to collaborate with each other. Some even commented on the surface ideological similarities between both movements. A Communist leader in Saxony Karl Sindermann stated, ‘Oh yes, we admit that we’re in league with the National Socialists… Bolshevism and Fascism share a common goal: the destruction of capitalism and of the Social Democratic Party. To achieve this aim we are justified in using every means.’ In an interview with the Danish newspaper Ekstrabladet in November 1932, a Communist member of the Prussian Landtag was reported to have referred to ‘occasional co-operation between Communists and National Socialists’ and to have said that, ‘Communists and National Socialists have certain common interests which they attend to when circumstances permit, although they usually oppose one another like fire and water.’ A disenchanted Communist Margarete Buber-Neumann recalled ‘When ordered to do so by the leadership, the simple rank and file SA and RFB would turn from fighting one another to co-operation.’ Former Comintern agent Jan Valtin recalled that ‘during 1931 alone’ the Communists engaged ‘…in dozens of terroristic enterprises in concert with Nazi elements.’ A memorandum from Georgi Dimitrov (Comintern leader) dated from mid-January 1931 to the KPD leaders called for ‘united action of the Communist party and the Hitler movement to accelerate the disintegration of the crumbling democratic bloc which governs Germany.’”

— Conan Fischer, The German Communists and The Rise of Nazism

A December 1930 KPD Revolutionary Union Opposition pamphlet appealed directly to Nazis, acknowledging past mistrust but emphasizing shared worker interests against capitalism, rising prices, and the Young Plan; it accused Social Democracy of betraying Marxism and called for a united front of sincere discussion to defeat international finance capital and secure national and social liberation. A 1924 KPD leaflet called for ending the oppression of workers by condemning both foreign and German exploiters, as well as Christian and Jewish ones.

Communists and Nazis collaborated directly in fundraising for strikes. The Nazis’ support for a massive strike in autumn 1930 deeply alarmed the business sector. Just two days after the new Reichstag convened, more than 126,000 Berlin metalworkers walked out to protest an arbitration ruling that enforced sharp wage cuts. The Social Democrats and communists immediately championed the workers’ cause, and the Nazis joined them. Joseph Goebbels, the regional party leader, ordered Nazi members to man the picket lines and warned that any strikebreaking would lead to expulsion from the party. When the communists introduced a Reichstag resolution to revoke the arbitration decision, the Nazis voted alongside the KPD and SPD to pass it.

According to Professor P. Valkenburg of Groningen University, Nazi and communist deputies in the German Reichstag voted together 70% of the time, prompting Pravda to praise the National Socialists for acting “much more proletarian” than the SPD. Within the Reichstag, as they frequently aligned on votes to topple the government, resisting debt repayments via the Young Plan and pro-capitalist economic measures. Clashes on the streets between SA fighters and KPD militias occurred regularly, but this “beefsteak” antagonism (brown exterior, red core) concealed deeper alignments; numerous ex-communists shifted to the Nazis, enticed by mutual hostility to democracy and capitalism. This “Red-Brown” synergy hastened Weimar’s downfall, facilitating Hitler’s chancellorship in 1933.

“The cooperation between the communist and Nazi parties in Germany to undermine social democracy must be one of the strangest and most extreme partnerships in political history.”

— Peter D. Stachura, How Communists In Germany Allied With Nazis to Destroy Democracy

Following the Third Reich’s establishment in January 1933, Hitler persisted in articulating his respect for German communists. He thought they could be reshaped through Nazi indoctrination efforts, which emphasized group-oriented values over personal autonomy. Hitler felt communists would embrace Nazi educational ideals since they prioritized the nation’s top talents, unlike conservatives or liberals focused solely on their offspring. Hitler also demonstrated a degree of esteem for his communist opponents, recognizing their common insurgent energy and dedication to socialist concepts in varying degrees. He indicated openness to reintegrating any communists who recommitted to the country. In an October 1935 address, Hitler noted that communists who supported the nation earned high esteem from Nazis.

This overlap involved significant crossovers in personnel, as numerous former communists integrated into Nazi organizations, often labeled “Beefsteak Nazis” to reflect their brown-shirted exterior hiding lingering red ideology. Beyond prominent cases like Theo Habicht and Roland Freisler, some communists infiltrated the SA for protection or covert operations, while others genuinely shifted allegiance over shared hostility toward the Weimar Republic. In various regions during the early 1930s, entire KPD groups defected en masse to the NSDAP, drawn by its revolutionary rhetoric and promises of social reform. Hitler actively encouraged this influx, issuing orders for swift admission of ex-communists, whom he viewed as more radical and valuable than moderate socialists. Early observer Konrad Heiden highlighted the trend in his 1936 work Hitler: A Biography, noting that the SA included “large numbers of Communists and Social Democrats” and that many stormtroopers were dubbed “beefsteaks” — brown on the outside, red inside. The frequency of such defections even prompted SA members to quip, “In our storm troop there are three Nazis, but we shall soon have spewed them out.” The phrase “Beefsteak Nazi” specifically referred to many socialists who had switched to the Nazi party.

As the Nazis solidified their absolute control in Germany, certain leading Social Democrats approved of policies favoring state ownership of sectors, vast estates, and other interventionist economic steps. Some justified Hitler’s phased method for socializing assets. In particular, Social Democrat Hugo Ramm foresaw in 1933 that Hitler would inevitably confront capitalist elites and traditional royalists while enacting socialist measures.

“As to nationalization of banks and trusts, every Socialist knows that you cannot produce ready- made socialism from a hat like a conjurer’s rabbit. Chancellor Hitler is determined to satisfy the workers and sooner or later will come into conflict with the reactionary big bourgeoisie.”

— G. E. R. Gedye, Nazis Seem Veering Toward Socialism

In 1934, SPD politician Karl Severing proclaimed his backing for Hitler and National Socialism.

Severing announced:

“As far back as 1932, I said at the Socialist Congress: ‘If National Socialism proves de facto that it is in a position to develop fruitful activity, the Social Democratic Party will acknowledge this movement.’”

— Karl Severing, quoted in Severing Espouses Hitler’s Doctrines New York Times, April 1, 1934

Elements within the German labor unions expressed affinity with Nazism, with some arguing that workers’ groups should conform to Nazi guidelines. August Winnig contended that labor priorities ought to yield to the Nazi regime’s demands. In the concluding edition of the union periodical Gewerkschaftszeitung in April 29, 1933, an author called for a structured scheme to nationalize production, expecting Hitler to seize control of financial institutions, core sectors, energy facilities, and major businesses. The piece also envisioned government oversight of international commerce and a directed economy supplanting free-market principles. During campaigns to dismantle the Weimar system, Nazis and communists repeatedly aligned in political, parliamentary, and armed capacities. This teamwork originated from the Weimar era’s outset, rooted in joint disdain for unrestricted capitalism, moderate socialism, Western coalitions, war indemnities, and balanced governance. In a June 1920 edition of Der Deutsche Sozialist, Julius Streicher encouraged socialists from diverse groups to band together against finance capital rather than production capital. Party official Bernhard Rust showed greater affinity for communists than for Social Democrats or rival groups. Additionally, Karl Kaufmann, who rose to Nazi leadership in Hamburg, suggested possible teamwork between Nazis and communists against outside dangers.

Even with the dominant anti-communist atmosphere of the 1930s, the extent of German-Soviet teamwork grew more evident after the 1939 Soviet-German neutrality agreement and related commerce deals. Hitler and his inner circle maintained fierce resistance to Soviet communism, seeing it as linked to a purported Jewish global scheme. Tensions escalated from the Lebensraum expansion aimed at Soviet lands, apprehensions about presumed Slavic ethnic shortcomings, and fears of Stalin’s plans to breach the neutrality deal by assaulting the Third Reich. Throughout the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, Hitler publicly recognized parallels between National Socialism and Communism.

“Basically National Socialism and Marxism are the same.”

— Adolf Hitler, quoted in Russia Under The Bolshevik Regime by Richard Pipes

The height of Soviet-Nazi teamwork materialized through the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a neutrality accord inked by diplomats Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov that astonished global observers. This deal not only averted a dual-front conflict for Germany but featured a confidential addendum allocating Eastern Europe into influence zones: the Soviets claimed the Baltic regions, eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and segments of Finland, while Germany secured western Poland. The agreement paved the way for the combined assault on Poland in September 1939, igniting World War II, with German and Soviet troops converging at Brest-Litovsk in a ceremonial transfer. Trade accords ensued: between 1939 and 1941, the USSR furnished Germany with exceeding 1 million tons of petroleum, 1.6 million tons of crops, and extensive supplies of manganese, textiles, and additional necessities critical for Nazi warfare, traded for schematics, industrial machinery, and defense innovations like ships and plane models. The Soviets additionally granted submarine docking facilities in the north and routed Asian resource transports via the Trans-Siberian line.

This partnership endured until Hitler’s deception via Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, yet it illustrated the practical extents of “Brown-Red” teamwork amid doctrinal conflicts. The accord also fostered direct teamwork between the NKVD and Gestapo, encompassing shared sessions on enforcement techniques and detainee swaps. The Soviets transferred numerous German communists and Jews who had escaped Nazi oppression to the USSR, handing them to the Gestapo for detention or death, with figures possibly totaling 4,000, encompassing seasoned activists and anti-fascists. This act fractured global anti-fascist efforts, as the Comintern instructed worldwide communist groups to halt anti-fascist campaigns and endorse the pact, generating disarray and abandonments among leftists who regarded the USSR as the defense against Nazism. Soviet messaging pivoted to a favorable Nazi slant, with Molotov justifying Germany in addresses, hailing the pact as a setback for aggressors and labeling “fascism is a matter of taste” while rejecting anti-German views.

“Despite contempt, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, dividing Eastern Europe and partitioning Poland, and included economic agreements.”

— Stephen Calkins, The Pre-War Relationship Between Nazi Germany and The Soviet Union

“The conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between the USSR and Germany is of tremendous positive value, eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the Soviet Union.”

— Vyacheslav Molotov, speech on The Meaning of The Soviet-German Pact

Vyacheslav Molotov, 1st of November 1939 Speech ‘In Defense of Fascism’

In an address allegedly delivered to the Politburo on August 19, 1939, mere days prior to the pact’s formalization, Stalin detailed his tactical reasoning for fomenting conflict between Germany and Western nations, intending to drain all involved and enable the USSR to broaden its sway via upheaval.

Hitler, shaped by thinkers like Karl Haushofer, developed his own intricate perspective on Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union. Hitler grew to value Stalin’s leadership style, viewing the Soviet Union as having progressed markedly from its initial Bolshevik phase. He regretted the misconceptions around the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Stalin, desiring an authentic connection with the Soviet figurehead. This feeling extended beyond Hitler; it resonated with German diplomat Joachim von Ribbentrop and Benito Mussolini. Despite the era’s suspicions, the Third Reich’s elite clung to the notion that Stalin’s Soviet Union could emerge as a steadfast partner. This hope surfaced periodically and alarmed British and French administrations. In 1940, the Soviet Union delivered essential petroleum to Nazi Germany, prompting British and French schemes to target Soviet fuel sites to halt aid to Germany. However, this never came to pass, as the Reich had already invaded the Soviet Union just two weeks prior to the attack in question.

In handling Soviet-German relations, Joseph Stalin proceeded with heightened caution. While maintaining a blend of admiration and wariness toward Hitler, Stalin took pains to steer clear of moves that could spark armed clashes. He saw potential in the idea that Hitler’s aims toward the USSR were sincere, but stayed vigilant against swift deteriorations. In 1940, a major trade pact was finalized between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, with the USSR providing commodities in trade for armaments. This arrangement assisted Germany in evading British-imposed trade barriers. Talks on potentially incorporating the Soviet Union into the Axis coalition occurred but failed to come to fruition.

The demands set by the Soviet Union for Axis membership were considered overly demanding by analysts. The Soviets sought to extend authority over various areas, including Finland and Romania, and more. This goal transcended simple land gains; it aimed to heighten Germany’s reliance on the Soviet Union for key supplies and assets. This approach unveiled the Soviet command’s outlook on ties with the Third Reich; they did not see Nazi Germany as a equal in opposing Anglo-American forces. Rather, the Soviet Union planned to leverage the partnership to ultimately overshadow Germany, turning it into a subordinate within the Soviet domain. Thus, this tactic implied that Germany would not participate as an equivalent in crafting the proposed new global structure with the Axis but would instead serve as a tool for advancing Soviet territorial and doctrinal ambitions.

Hitler’s correspondence to Joseph Stalin, spanning late 1940 to mid-1941, paints a layered picture of tactical guarantees and political strategies preceding Operation Barbarossa. Starting with a New Year’s greeting on December 31, 1940, Hitler worked to ease Soviet anxieties over German troop shifts to Poland, framing them as simple relocations to evade British surveillance. He emphasized the transient aspect of these deployments, vowing withdrawal post-victory over England, and contended that no aggressive designs targeted the USSR. Hitler also refuted rumors of impending hostilities with the Soviet Union as unfounded, underlining the need for secrecy in their dialogues. Marshal Georgy Zhukov, describing a January 1941 session with Stalin, disclosed that Hitler’s note responded to an earlier, undisclosed query from Stalin about the purpose of German forces in Poland. This interaction forms a crucial segment of a wider story where Hitler endeavored to persuade Stalin of Germany’s non-hostile stance toward the USSR during military repositioning.

In a further key missive dated May 14, 1941, Hitler reinforced his belief that enduring European stability hinged on England’s downfall. While admitting internal dissent on this path, he aimed to convince Stalin that the German accumulation along the Soviet border signaled no imminent strife. Hitler expressed worries about accidental provocations from German troops, requesting Stalin’s forbearance in such events. He concluded by expressing gratitude for Stalin’s agreement on an unspecified issue and suggested a personal summit to address concluding the English war and forging a nationalist take on socialist internationalism.

“For a final solution of what to do with this bankrupt English legacy, and also for the consolidation of the union of socialist countries and the establishment of new world order, I would like very much to meet personally with you. I have spoken about this with Messrs. Molotov and Dekanozov.”

— Adolf Hitler, quoted in What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa by David E. Murphy

Hitler’s multifaceted outlook on Stalin captured this interplay, merging competition with esteem for the Soviet leader’s mercilessness and proficiency. Privately, Hitler regarded Stalin as a worthy competitor, more aligned in perspective than Western figures, and dispatched positive sentiments for Stalin’s health and the Soviet populace’s prosperity during the pact period. Stalin reciprocated by praising Hitler’s firm measures, like the Night of The Long Knives elimination, identifying similarities to his own approaches. These shared admirations underscore how, despite the ultimate conflict, the regimes possessed authoritarian foundations that enabled their collaborations.

“Hitler admired Stalin’s revolutionary consistency above all, but exactly this consistency, which went far further than his own, also made him afraid.”

— Sebastian Haffner, How Adolf Hitler Began to Admire Josef Stalin

During the harsh offensive against the Soviet Union, Hitler continued to voice a measure of appreciation for communists and their resolute devotion to their beliefs. He maintained that most enduring communists had blended into Nazi formations, highlighting his regard for their endurance and bravery. Hitler genuinely valued the determination and fortitude exhibited by German communists in opposing Stalin. He regularly reflected on prior confrontations with them, noting how these former foes had become his most dependable supporters. He cherished those with the resilience to resist and engage, acknowledging their importance to the party during escalating challenges. Deep into World War II, Hitler articulated his endorsement of the Soviet economic model. He openly commended the USSR’s system, especially praising the strict discipline and competition encouraged by the Stakhanovite initiative.

“The Soviet worker was taught by means of the Stakhanov system to work both harder and longer than his counterpart in either Germany or the capitalist States.”

“It is very stupid to sneer at the Stakhanov system. The arms and equipment of the Russian armies are the best proof of its efficiency in the handling of industrial man-power. Stalin, too, must command our unconditional respect. In his own way he is a hell of a fellow! He knows his models, Genghiz Khan and the others, very well, and the scope of his industrial planning is exceeded only by our own Four Year Plan. And there is no doubt that he is quite determined that there shall be in Russia no unemployment such as one finds in such capitalist States as the United States of America…”

— Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Table Talks

Russian scholar Andrei Fursov has delved into the complex factors fueling Hitler’s profound skepticism toward his military commanders, especially his concern that they might instigate a clash with the Soviet Union to serve British interests. This distrust had foundations. However, a pervasive anti-Soviet sentiment, coupled with escalating uncertainties about Stalin, significantly shaped Hitler’s choices. He increasingly depended on Germany’s spy organizations, which pushed for a preventive assault on the USSR despite his hesitations. Fursov spotlights the enigmatic involvement of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, director of the Abwehr. Starting in 1939, Canaris covertly collaborated with British spies. He altered commands, fabricated instructions, and suppressed legitimate ones. Via ongoing links to London, he supplied Hitler with assessments that depicted the Soviet Union negatively, steering the Führer toward initiating Operation Barbarossa. The extent of Canaris’s betrayal emerged only in 1944.

Lecture by Andrei Fursov on how Adolf Hitler allegedly got tricked into attacking the USSR

This espionage effort was instrumental in cementing Hitler’s decision to attack. Diplomat Joachim von Ribbentrop vehemently resisted the scheme and alerted a Soviet envoy to a certain German defeat. Per David Irving’s Hitler’s War, Hitler dismissed Ribbentrop’s proposal to eliminate Stalin, indicating a level of reluctant respect. Concurrently, Moscow’s unwillingness to endorse Japan’s strikes on British and American assets — despite Japanese appeals — highlighted the USSR’s commitment to its own agenda. Following the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt, Hitler attributed fault to Canaris and his associates. He condemned them as a group of ambitious, unethical, and foolish officers intent on his demise and the military’s dismantlement. Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg’s detonation severely injured multiple staff and claimed one life. Hitler pledged to eradicate the full disloyal web.

The German traitors

“We have liquidated the left-wing class fighters, but unfortunately we forgot in the meantime to also launch the decisive blow against the capitalist right. That is our great sin of omission.”

— Adolf Hitler, quoted in The Nazi War Against Capitalism by Nevin Gussack

Even without probing the deeper economic parallels, the sheer web of political interconnections — spanning joint military training, trade pacts, personnel crossovers, and tactical sabotage of liberal democracy — already reveals a startling convergence of method and mindset between the Nazi and Soviet projects. This was no mere marriage of convenience; it was a shared strain of totalitarian socialist anti-capitalism of heretical Marxism, expressed through leader-worship, mass mobilization, and the ruthless instrumentalization of ideology for power.

One stark lesson emerges from this overlap: Hitler’s ultimate undoing stemmed directly from his failure to purge the right-wing establishment. Having crushed the communists and social democrats with fanatical thoroughness, he left the old conservative elites — industrial barons, Junkers, and Reichswehr officers — intact, believing their expertise and prestige could be harnessed. Instead, they became the silent rot within the regime, culminating in betrayals like Canaris’s intelligence sabotage and the July 1944 bomb plot. In sparing the right, Hitler preserved the very class whose loyalty was conditional and whose vision of order clashed with his revolutionary pretensions.

Had history tilted differently….. had Hitler sustained the Rapallo spirit, deepened the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and followed through on the 1940 negotiations to bring the Soviets into the Axis as a fourth power — the war would have unfolded under a formidable Berlin-Moscow Axis. Mussolini, ever the pragmatist, openly favored such an alignment, seeing in a Nazi-Fascist-Japanese-Soviet bloc: a bulwark against Anglo-American liberalism. As he affirmed to Hitler mere days after the pact’s signing:

“Concerning the agreement with Russia, I approve of that completely. His Excellency Marshal Goring will tell you that in the discussion which I had with him last April I stated that a rapprochement between Germany and Russia was necessary to prevent encirclement by the democracies.”

— Benito Mussolini, letter to Adolf Hitler, August 25, 1939

Even before the invasion of Poland, Italy enjoyed notably warmer relations with the USSR than Germany did, having signed a 1933 Treaty of Friendship, Non-Aggression, and Neutrality and being among the first Western powers to recognize the Soviet regime de jure in 1924. This rapport could have smoothed diplomatic frictions, enabling a more cohesive and effective Eurasian front backed by German technology, Soviet resources, and Italian mediation — that it collapsed due to internal political maneuvering and sabotage by spies like Canaris, who actively worked against Nazi initiatives (including by leaking intelligence to the Allies and undermining Hitler’s war efforts from within the Abwehr) to amplify skepticism and feed into Hitler’s general distrust of Slavic peoples, underscores how avoidable the rupture truly was. This potential was further squandered during the height of the Eastern Front conflict, when Stalin — intending to buy time for the Soviet Union to rebuild its depleted resources and military strength after devastating losses — unsuccessfully extended peace proposals to Hitler via neutral channels in Sweden during December 1942 and the summer of 1943, offering territorial concessions and trade deals reminiscent of the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Hitler flatly rejected these overtures, declaring in November 1942 that no further peace offers would come from Germany, driven by his ideological commitment to eradicate Bolshevism and secure Lebensraum in the East. The dynamic reversed by 1945 as the Third Reich crumbled: desperate Nazi leaders, including Goebbels (who sent General Hans Krebs to negotiate a ceasefire with Soviet General Vasily Chuikov in Berlin on May 1, proposing an anti-Western alliance) and Hitler’s successors Karl Dönitz and Wilhelm Keitel (who allegedly drafted a speculative document envisioning a renewed “Socialist Union” with the USSR against Western capitalism, per T. H. Tetens’ 1953 analysis, though this remains unverified in primary archives), sought last-minute peace, only for Stalin — now holding the advantage amid Nazi atrocities, to demand unconditional surrender, culminating in the German capitulation signed by Keitel in Berlin on May 8/9. These missed opportunities turned one of the war’s greatest potential alliances into Hitler’s greatest failure, as detailed in sources like Paul Johnson’s Modern Times and Albert Speer’s Inside The Third Reich.

If there’s one takeaway as a fascist, it’s to never trust the right-wing, for we ourselves are National Bolsheviks at our core. The distinctions between these currents — whether in gradual vs. abrupt socialist implementation, ethnic vs. class, or tactical alliances against Western liberalism — ultimately amount to little more than debating whether one prefers a red apple or a green one; at the end of the day, the superficial hue pales against the concrete substance that unites them: socialism fused with nationalism, and an unyielding hostility toward global capitalism, a convergence that could have forged an unbreakable Eurasianism had internal sabotages and distrusts not derailed it into catastrophe.

“The right-wing parties soon realized that they couldn’t count on NSDAP, and called us National-Bolsheviks or National-Marxists for our socialist stance. As a matter of fact, they were right.”

— Horst Wessel, Politika