The Anti-Zionism of Italian Fascism

by Zoltanous

Introduction

Italian Fascism’s relationship with Jews and Zionism has long been distorted by both mainstream historians and ideological opponents who prefer simple narratives of blanket racism or philo-Semitism. In reality, early Fascism was notably inclusive toward Italian Jews: they were overrepresented in the movement relative to their tiny share of the population (roughly 0.1%), with Jews making up nearly 6% of the 1919 Sansepolcrists founders and 21% of participants at the 1925 Bologna meeting on Fascist culture. Jewish membership in the National Fascist party (PNF) ran 2–3 times higher than their demographic weight, and thousands joined between 1928–1933 at rates comparable to non-Jews. Prominent Jewish Fascists like Margherita Sarfatti, Gino Arias, and others held influential roles. Mussolini’s pre-1938 regime was not like the Nazi model; opposition to Jews was primarily political, cultural, and centered on anti-communism, anti-bourgeois internationalism, and above all, rejection of Zionism as a force that fostered dual loyalties and served British imperialism.

This context is essential for understanding Fascism’s anti-Zionism not as irrational hatred but as coherent realpolitik rooted in Mediterranean ambitions and anti-imperialist principles. What follows is the full record of that stance, from Mussolini’s earliest writings to concrete support for Palestinian resistance — demonstrating how Fascist Italy became the first European state to materially back the Arab struggle against the British Mandate and Zionist colonization.

Mussolini’s Stand Against British Imperialism and Zionist Colonization In Palestine

Italian Fascism under Benito Mussolini forged a clear and consistent anti-Zionist line from its earliest years in power. This was never abstract ideology alone but a concrete geopolitical and anti-imperialist policy that viewed Zionism as a British tool to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean at Italy’s expense. Fascist Italy rejected the Balfour Declaration’s logic, opposed the League of Nations mandates, and actively supported Arab resistance in Palestine to block Jewish immigration and the Zionist project. The regime’s actions — rhetorical, diplomatic, and material — demonstrated solidarity with Palestinian Arabs against what it saw as foreign-imposed disruption and demographic engineering in the Holy Land.

Mussolini laid this foundation even before the March on Rome. In an article published in Il Popolo d’Italia on October 19, 1920, he referred directly to the “anti-patriotic position of Zionism,” framing it as a force that undermined national loyalties and served external powers rather than genuine self-determination. This critique sharpened in Parliament. In his speech to the Chamber on June 21, 1921, Mussolini declared:

“We must choose; the Government must have its own point of view. Either it chooses the English Zionist point of view, or it chooses the point of view of Benedict XV… Now, while the civilized nations of the West have not modified the common regime of freedom for the various religious confessions, in Palestine the opposite has happened, also because the administration of that embryonic State has been entrusted to the political organization of Zionism.”

— Benito Mussolini, speech to the Chamber, June 21, 1921

Just weeks later, on July 7, 1921, Il Popolo d’Italia published Arabs Against Jews In Palestine: New Massacres. The article framed the Jaffa riots as the direct result of British-backed Zionist intrusion, where peaceful coexistence among Arabs, Christians, and Jews had prevailed for centuries under Ottoman rule. It placed full blame on England and identified Zionism as an instrument of British imperialism that shattered the region’s fragile balance and provoked inevitable Arab resistance:

“The blood that is currently spilling in Palestine is the fault of England. As Mussolini pointed out in Parliament, in his anti-Zionist speech, Zionism has become an instrument of British imperialism. For many centuries Palestine was quiet. The Arabs, Christians and Jews coexisted peacefully. But now Palestine has become the scene of bloody battles. You can thank the ‘wonderful’ diplomacy of the Entente for this!”

— Arabs Against Jews In Palestine: New Massacres, Il Popolo d’Italia, July 7, 1921

By 1922, Mussolini expanded this critique into a comprehensive rejection of the entire mandate system in his article Italy and Freedom For Syria, published in Il Popolo d’Italia on June 16, 1922. He condemned the Anglo-French mandates as “a real abuse of power; a real fraud,” invalidated by the collapse of the Treaty of Sèvres and in violation of the League Covenant’s own limits on temporary “aid and advice.” Palestine was singled out as the English foothold, enabled precisely through Zionism:

“France’s plan is to convert the Eastern Mediterranean — apart from the English parenthesis of Palestine, even if through Zionism, which the Jewish colonizers themselves fight bitterly — into an almost completely French sea.”

— Benito Mussolini, Italy and Freedom For Syria, Il Popolo d’Italia, June 16, 1922

Mussolini warned that ratifying these mandates would ignite endless bloody turmoil, destroy any possibility of resumed Italian trade in the region, and expand Anglo-French (and by extension Zionist) dominance to Italy’s direct detriment. He contrasted the civilized capacity of Arab nations like Syria, unified in race and language, rich in schools, universities, and enterprise — with their reduction to terror-governed colonies under French and British rule. The message was unambiguous: Fascist Italy would not be a passive accomplice. Supporting the mandates meant endorsing Zionism as a wedge for British imperialism in Palestine, harming Italian interests and Mediterranean stability alike. Both the Fascist party and the Popular party stood united against ratification, issuing orders to Italy’s representatives at the League of Nations.

This early opposition was rooted in the revolutionary anti-colonial instincts of Fascism itself. Zionism was not seen as a legitimate national aspiration but as a political instrument that granted undue administrative power to Jewish organizations under British auspices, undermining religious freedoms, local autonomy, and the natural order of the region. Mussolini’s Italy consistently framed the Palestine question as one of resistance to imposed colonization, where Arab grievances against Jewish immigration and land acquisition were legitimate responses to foreign disruption. The policy deepened in the following years. In 1928, Mussolini directly confronted the implications of Zionism for Italian Jews and national sovereignty:

“A Jewish problem exists, and it is no longer confined to that shadowy sphere.”

— Benito Mussolini, The Zionists, Il Popolo di Roma, December 16, 1928

This acknowledgment tied into Fascism’s broader critique: Zionism fostered dual loyalties and international complications that clashed with national sovereignty and regional realities in Palestine. It echoed the earlier warnings about the “anti-patriotic position of Zionism” and the risks a Jewish state posed to Italian Jews’ loyalty to the patria. Fascist Italy maintained a brief tactical association with certain Revisionist Zionist elements, particularly under Vladimir Jabotinsky. This included the short-lived hosting of the Betar Naval Academy in Civitavecchia (1934–1937) and occasional statements that appeared supportive of Zionist goals.

For instance, in conversations tied to these contacts, Mussolini reportedly told intermediaries:

“You must create a Jewish state. I am a Zionist, and I told Dr Weizmann so. You must have a real country, not that ridiculous National Home that the British have offered you. I will help you create a Jewish state.”

— Benito Mussolini (reported in context of meetings with Zionist figures, circa 1934–1935)

And later, in 1943 during the Italian Social Republic, when Mussolini governed under heavy German influence after his rescue from imprisonment), he was reported as saying:

“I am a Zionist. I have always been a Zionist.”

— Benito Mussolini reported by Luigi Preti

Yet these statements must be understood within the broader geopolitical framework of Fascist Italy rather than taken at face value as evidence of genuine commitment to the Zionist project. The regime’s occasional tactical engagement with Zionist organizations emerged primarily in the context of undermining British authority in Palestine during periods of tension between Zionist factions and the British Mandate, while Italy simultaneously continued expressing support for forms of Arab self-government opposed to Entente domination. Even among Jewish Fascists loyal to the regime, anti-Zionism was often pronounced. One revealing example was Ettore Ovazza, a fervent Jewish Fascist and founder of the journal La Nostra Bandiera (“Our Flag”), a publication devoted to defending Fascism while attacking Zionism as incompatible with Italian national loyalty. Ovazza’s later work, Sionismo Bifronte, likewise portrayed Zionism as politically duplicitous and subversive rather than as a legitimate national movement. The existence of openly anti-Zionist Jewish Fascists underscores the extent to which opposition to Zionism within Fascist Italy was tied not merely to racial policy, but also to the regime’s conception of national unity, anti-British geopolitics, and hostility toward supranational political loyalties.

“The Zionist card had lost its value in the eyes of the Fascists: alliance with Germany, a pro-Arab policy, and a Mediterranean agreement with England had modified the view the Palazzo Chigi had of Palestine. The efforts of those Jews who, feeling the storm rising above their heads, tried to ward it off by attempting to convince important Fascist leaders that Italy could at last replace Great Britain within the mandate over Palestine, came to nothing.”

— Renzo De Felice, The Jews In Fascist Italy

Within this framing, Mussolini’s remarks appearing sympathetic toward Zionism were largely instrumental and strategic rather than ideological endorsements. The regime’s limited contacts with Zionist organizations functioned less as support for the Zionist project itself than as an attempt to exploit fractures within the British imperial sphere for Italian geopolitical advantage. These remarks were strictly instrumental and tied to the regime’s goal of encouraging the emigration or deportation of Jews from Italy. The limited contacts served as a pragmatic means to facilitate Jewish departure from the peninsula while potentially placing pro-Italian elements in Palestine to undermine British control. They did not reflect genuine endorsement of the mainstream Zionist project under the British Mandate, nor did they alter the regime’s fundamental opposition to Zionist colonization in the Holy Land.

The policy did not remain rhetorical. By the mid-1930s, especially after the Ethiopian campaign heightened tensions with Britain, Fascist Italy moved to material solidarity with the Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. As historian Stefano Fabei has emphasized:

“It must be said that (Fascist) Italy was the first European state to concretely support the liberation struggle of the Palestinian people against the British mandate and the Zionist project in the Holy Land… Fascist Italy supported the Palestinian resistance… This contradicts what the internationalist left claims, which claims to have been the first to support the Palestinian cause.”

— Stefano Fabei, Mussolini e la resistenza palestinese

This support included diplomatic outreach to Iraqi nationalists as part of a wider strategy to bolster Arab forces opposing British imperialism and Zionist settlement across the region. Between September 10, 1936, and June 15, 1938, Italy provided the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, leader of the uprising against British forces and Jewish immigration, with approximately £138,000. This was a substantial sum, decided personally by Mussolini in the aftermath of Ethiopia:

“Between 10 September 1936 and 15 June 1938 Fascist Italy paid the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who led the uprising of the Palestinian people against Britain’s military forces and against immigration Jewish, about £138,000, a sum of all respects for those times. This financial contribution was decided by the Duce in the aftermath of the war in Ethiopia, not only «due to the position taken by Italy towards Arab nationalism, and to annoy the English», but also in homage to the anti-colonialist positions of the revolutionary socialist Mussolini and early fascism. In addition to money the ministry of Foreigners decided to send the Palestinian mujahideen a significant shipment of weapons and ammunition, originally intended for the Negus, but bought in Belgium via the SIM. This material, deposited for almost two years in Taranto, it was supposed to reach the Palestinians through Saudi intermediaries engaged in the first great intifâda to overthrow the Hashemite kingdom of Transjordan, end the British protectorate, block the arrival of other Jews and the Zionist project in the Holy Land.”

— Stefano Fabei, Mussolini e la resistenza palestinese

In 1937, efforts intensified to execute the arms shipments, with detailed planning for Belgian-sourced weapons routed through Saudi Arabia to Palestinian fighters. These diplomatic and logistical ties extended to Iraqi channels, where Italy cultivated anti-British Arab nationalists to amplify pressure against the Mandate and Zionist colonization. The arms and funding, explicitly aimed at ending the British protectorate, halting further Jewish immigration, and blocking the Zionist project entirely — represented deliberate anti-Zionist action. Fascist Italy sought to match German outreach to Arab nationalists while reviving its own pragmatic anti-imperialist principles. Secret contacts with the Mufti and the tangible financial and logistical support represented the most concrete form of Italian involvement in destabilizing British control through the Palestinian uprising. It was a coherent extension of the 1920s stance, Mussolini’s regime acted to defend Arab autonomy and prevent the consolidation of a British-backed Zionist entity in Palestine.

“The Arab movement in Palestine is legitimate; Fascist Italy recognizes its right to resist Zionist colonization and British rule.”

— Benito Mussolini, quoted in Fascist Italy and The Middle East by N. Arielli,

Conclusions

The historical record leaves little room for ambiguity: Italian Fascism’s opposition to Zionism was neither fleeting nor opportunistic in its core orientation, but a sustained expression of the regime’s anti-imperialism and Mediterranean strategic priorities. From Mussolini’s earliest interventions in Il Popolo d’Italia through the material aid extended to the Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, the regime treated Zionism not as a legitimate national movement but as an extension of British imperial engineering, one that disrupted regional stability, imposed demographic change, and threatened Italian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. This stance aligned with Fascism’s broader rejection of the League of Nations mandates as fraudulent instruments of Anglo-French domination, while simultaneously recognizing the legitimacy of Arab resistance to foreign colonization in the Holy Land.

Post-war narratives that portray early Fascism as either uniformly philo-Semitic or merely a pale imitation of Nazi racial policy overlook the regime’s distinctive approach. Italian Jews participated actively and disproportionately in the movement’s formative years precisely because pre-1938 Fascism defined itself through national loyalty rather than biological exclusion. Opposition to Zionism arose from the same principle: the conviction that it promoted dual allegiances incompatible with the Fascist ideal of total identification with the Italian state. Even the brief tactical openings toward certain Revisionist elements, including the Betar academy and reported statements encouraging a Jewish state — served instrumental goals of weakening British control and facilitating emigration, never amounting to ideological alignment with the mainstream Zionist project under the Mandate.

The apparent tension between Mussolini’s occasional remarks and the regime’s concrete support for Arab forces dissolves when viewed through the lens of realpolitik. Financial subsidies to the Mufti, planned arms shipments routed through Saudi intermediaries, and diplomatic cultivation of anti-British nationalists formed a coherent policy aimed at halting Zionist colonization and undermining the British position in Palestine. In this respect, Fascist Italy stood as one of the first European powers to translate rhetorical anti-Zionism into tangible assistance for Palestinian resistance — a record that directly challenges later claims by internationalist movements to exclusive solidarity with the Arab cause.

Equating Zionism wholesale with Fascism (or Nazism) is equally absurd. Such reductions flatten profound differences in motivation, context, and outcome, ignoring how Fascist policy consistently prioritized Arab grievances and regional balance over any endorsement of a sovereign Jewish entity in Palestine. Ultimately, the anti-Zionism of Italian Fascism emerged from a fusion of revolutionary nationalism, anti-colonial instinct, and pragmatic strategy. It rejected the Balfour agreement as an artificial intrusion, framed Arab resistance as legitimate self-defense, and acted materially to prevent the consolidation of a British-backed Zionist foothold. Whatever limited tactical ambiguities arose in the 1930s, the regime’s record — preserved in Mussolini’s speeches, party newspapers, diplomatic cables, and archival evidence, demonstrates a clear and consistent line: opposition to Zionist colonization as a threat to Italian interests and to the natural order of the Near East. This legacy endures as a corrective to oversimplified histories, reminding us that Fascist Italy’s engagement with the Palestine question was driven by concrete geopolitical realities rather than abstract racial dogma or ideological contradiction.