The Anti-Zionism of Nazi Germany
by Zoltanous
Adolf Hitler articulated National Socialism’s foundational rejection of Zionism well before Mein Kampf. In a speech on July 6, 1920, he publicly declared that Jews belonged in Palestine and that it was only there they could expect their full civil rights — a statement framed not as endorsement of Jewish self-determination but as a means to remove them from Germany and Europe entirely, consistent with the antisemitic view that Jews were an unassimilable racial threat. This theme was elaborated at length in Mein Kampf, where Hitler dismissed Zionist claims of seeking a genuine national homeland as a deliberate deception aimed at the “dumb goyim”:
“For while the Zionists try to make the rest of the world believe that the national consciousness of the Jew finds its satisfaction in the creation of a Palestinian state, the Jews again slyly dupe the dumb goyim. It doesn’t even enter their heads to build up a Jewish state for the purpose of living there; all they want is a central organisation for their international world swindle, endowed with its own sovereign rights and removed from the intervention of other states: a haven for convicted scoundrels and a university for budding crooks.”
“There was a great movement among them, well-represented in Vienna, and which strongly confirmed the national character of Jewry: this was Zionism… From outward appearances, it seemed as if only part of the Jews championed this movement, while the great majority disapproved of or even repudiated it. But a close examination showed that those appearances were deliberately misleading… This fictitious conflict between the Zionists and the liberal Jews soon disgusted me; it was thoroughly false, and in direct contradiction to the moral dignity and immaculate character on which that people had always prided itself.”
— Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
This was not a marginal remark but central to the Nazi worldview. Alfred Rosenberg and other ideologues echoed it, portraying Zionism as confirmation that Jews could never truly assimilate while still constituting a racial threat that used “nationalism” as cover for global financial and political control. Nazi propaganda consistently framed Zionism not as self-determination but as part of the same international Jewish conspiracy that manifested in Bolshevism, finance capitalism, and efforts to undermine all nations. Opposition was therefore racial and political from the outset, not merely reactive.
Upon seizing power in 1933, the Nazi regime confronted an immediate international Jewish-led boycott of German goods while prioritizing the removal of Jews from German life to achieve Judenrein. This practical convergence produced the Haavara (“Transfer”) Agreement, signed on August 25, 1933, after three months of negotiations between the Nazi Economics Ministry, the Zionist Federation of Germany, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine (via the Anglo-Palestine Bank).
Under its terms, emigrating German Jews could transfer a portion of their assets by depositing funds into a special account in Germany; these funds were then used to purchase German export goods shipped to Palestine, where the Yishuv redeemed them for local currency (Palestine pounds). Emigrants had to meet strict British immigration certificate criteria, often requiring at least £1,000 sterling in capital. The agreement enabled roughly 53,000–60,000 German Jews to emigrate to Palestine between 1933 and 1939 (with some estimates reaching 66,000 including related transfers). It allowed Jews to salvage some value from their property that would otherwise have been frozen or confiscated under Nazi restrictions, while the Jewish Agency initially masked its direct role, presenting it as a private economic arrangement. Adolf Eichmann even visited Palestine in 1937 to assess emigration prospects firsthand.
Nazi motivations were explicitly anti-Jewish and economic: accelerate emigration, preserve foreign currency reserves, weaken the global boycott (which the agreement helped undermine by channeling German goods directly to the Yishuv), boost German exports and industrial production during the Depression, and reduce Jewish influence inside Germany. Top Nazis including Reinhard Heydrich (in SD assessments) and Adolf Eichmann viewed cooperation with Zionists as tactically useful because, unlike “assimilationist” Jews who sought to remain and allegedly infiltrate, Zionists actively desired to leave. Hitler’s own support fluctuated; he initially expressed reservations but approved continuation in phases (notably 1937–1939) when it aligned with emigration priorities before the policy radicalized further.
The agreement faced fierce opposition from many Jewish organizations worldwide, who saw it as sabotaging the anti-Nazi boycott campaign. For Zionists, it was a pragmatic rescue and nation-building mechanism amid persecution. Yet it was never ideological endorsement of Zionism or acceptance of a Jewish state. Internal Foreign Ministry discussions by 1937 explicitly warned that successful Jewish settlement in Palestine risked creating a sovereign base for anti-German agitation and international Jewish power. As persecution intensified via the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, the Anschluss, Kristallnacht in 1938, and escalating restrictions, any tactical overlap diminished. The regime banned most Jewish organizations but tolerated Zionist ones longer solely because they facilitated departure, a pragmatic distinction rather than sympathy. By the outbreak of war in 1939, practical continuation became impossible.
Similar to Fascist Italy’s brief engagement with Vladimir Jabotinsky’s Revisionist Zionists (including the Betar Naval Academy in Civitavecchia, 1934–1937), National Socialist Germany saw limited, opportunistic contacts with certain Revisionist Zionist factions who shared anti-British sentiments and sought alliances against the Mandate. These Revisionist groups, emphasizing militarism and maximalist territorial claims, occasionally adopted fascist-inspired aesthetics or tactics and viewed Axis powers as potential partners to expel British influence from Palestine.
The most notable were overtures from Lehi/Stern Gang, the extremist splinter from Irgun led by Avraham “Yair” Stern. Late in 1940, Lehi; having identified a common interest between the intentions of the “new German order” and Jewish national aspirations, proposed forming an alliance in World War II with Nazi Germany. In December 1940, Lehi contacted Germany with a formal proposal to aid German conquest in the Middle East in return for recognition of a Jewish state open to unlimited immigration. Specifically, Lehi offered to rebel against the British while Germany would recognize an independent Jewish state in Palestine/Eretz Israel, and all Jews leaving their homes in Europe (by their own will or because of government injunctions) could enter Palestine with no restriction of numbers. Lehi envisioned a future Jewish state based on “nationalist and totalitarian principles” allied with the German Reich, and proposed that 40,000 Jews could be immediately armed and trained to fight the British.
The proposal was conveyed by Lehi representative Naftali (or Naphtali) Lubenchik, one of Stern’s closest confidantes and a well-educated man fluent in German. At the end of November 1940 (or early December), Lubenchik met with German official Werner Otto von Hentig in Beirut, then under Vichy French control. Lubenchik sought to pass the proposal directly to Berlin, arguing that Nazi Germany and its allies did not seek “the physical destruction of the Jewish people, but rather their expulsion from Europe and their concentration in one place.” A second attempt followed in early 1941. On 11 January 1941, Vice Admiral Ralf von der Marwitz, the German naval attaché in Turkey, filed a report (the “Ankara document”) conveying Lehi’s offer to “actively take part in the war on Germany’s side” in return for German support for “the establishment of the historic Jewish state on a national and totalitarian basis, bound by a treaty with the German Reich.” Documents related to the proposal were forwarded by the Germans from Beirut/Istanbul to Ankara.
“It concludes that the approaches of German anti-Semitism and National Socialism to Zionism and the Zionist movement in Germany reflect a relatively consistent ideology that was applied in an inconsistent and often contradictory manner, one that in the end undermined the efforts of German Zionism to achieve fundamental Zionist goals.”
— Francis R. Nicosia, Zionism and Anti-Semitism In Nazi Germany
Stern made similar overtures (including to Fascist Italy) multiple times, emphasizing shared anti-British goals and offering Lehi’s military assistance in the region in exchange for Axis support. These proposals were not endorsed or pursued by the Nazis, who by then prioritized the broader “Final Solution” and saw all Jewish political activity as part of the same racial enemy. They reflected Revisionist opportunism, anti-British extremism, and Stern’s belief that a wartime alliance could serve Hebrew liberation more than any Nazi ideological sympathy for Zionism. Mainstream Zionist bodies and the broader movement rejected such collaboration. Like the Haavara Agreement, these contacts were strictly tactical, short-lived, and subordinate to National Socialism’s unchanging racial anti-Semitism and opposition to any sovereign Jewish power base.
Nazi policy toward Palestine was never static. Early encouragement of emigration (including limited facilitation to Palestine) gave way to comprehensive exclusion as the “Jewish question” radicalized. The 1937 Peel Commission partition plan, which proposed creating a Jewish state in part of Palestine, prompted a clear internal policy review. On June 1, 1937, German Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath sent cables to German diplomats in London, Jerusalem, and Baghdad stating that neither a Zionist state nor a Zionist political structure under British rule would be in Germany’s interest.
“The formation of a Jewish state or a Jewish-led political structure under British mandate is not in Germany’s interest, since a Palestinian state would not absorb world Jewry but would create an additional position of power under international law tor international Jewry, somewhat like the Vatican State for political Catholicism or Moscow for the Comintern.
Germany therefore had an interest in strengthening the Arab world as a counterweight, but ‘it is not to be expected, of course, that direct German intervention would influence essentially the development of the Palestine question.’ Under no circumstances were the Palestinians to get more than token support at that stage: ‘understanding for Arab nationalist aspirations should be expressed more clearly than before, but without making any definite promises.’”
— Konstantin von Neurath, quoted in Documents on German Foreign Policy, June 1, 1937
Dr. Walter Gross, director of the NSDAP’s Office of Racial Policy, made it clear that the Germans held a strong sympathy toward the Semitic Arabs, which stood in sharp contrast to their profound contempt for the Jews.
“No serious voice in Germany has ever asserted that the Arabs are racially inferior or occupy a low place in the scale of human racial worth. On the contrary, National Socialist racial theory regards the Arabs as a valuable and capable race with a proud and heroic history. For this reason, the German people have always closely followed and actively supported the Arabs’ political struggle for freedom against the Jewish seizure of Palestine.”
— Dr. Walter Gross, Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben
Many leftist commentators, eager to depict the Third Reich as essentially Zionist-driven, heavily emphasize the Haavara Agreement as supposed proof of Nazi–Zionist cooperation and even friendship. This interpretation, shaped by Marxist ideological lenses, clashes with the actual historical record and the broader realities of Nazi policy. The Nazis never intended to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. On the contrary, they held quite different postwar designs for the Middle East, chief among them the creation of a Greater Syrian state.
“The document further outlines plans to establish an Iraqi government under al-Gaylani and a Greater Syrian government under al-Husayni.
The document also goes into some detail about a planned “New Order in the Arab Space” (Die Neuordnung des arabischen Raumes). It stipulates that “Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt would remain independent states,” and that “Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan would be united in a Greater Syrian state.” While the term “independent” is used to describe Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt, states that had enjoyed varying degrees of self-government before the war, it is omitted from the statement about Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. Moreover, Iraq would annex Kuwait, while Saudi Arabia would take Aqaba to its northwest, as well as Bahrain, Oman, and much of the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula that had been under British control since the middle of the nineteenth century.”
— Francis R. Nicosia, Nazi Germany and The Arab world
Germany therefore had “an interest in strengthening the Arab world,” but direct intervention was limited to expressions of sympathy without firm promises. This shift reflected growing Nazi concerns that a sovereign Jewish entity would serve as a headquarters for the very international conspiracy National Socialism sought to destroy. In private remarks as late as October 25, 1941, Hitler stated bluntly, “The attempt to found a Jewish state will fail.”


Citation: Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Volume VIII, Pg 746
Nazi anti-Zionism remained inseparable from racial antisemitism. Both Germany and Fascist Italy converged on viewing a Jewish Palestine as destabilizing to their strategic interests. Nazi Germany intensified outreach to Arab leaders opposed to British rule and Zionist immigration. This included indirect support for the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, with German arms, funding, and propaganda aiding anti-British and anti-Zionist forces. In a speech at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, 1939, Hitler highlighted British hypocrisy in Palestine while denouncing external interference:
“What right has England to shoot down Arabs in Palestine, only because they are standing up for their home?”
— Adolf Hitler, speech at Wilhelmshaven, April 1, 1939
Propaganda under Joseph Goebbels increasingly depicted Zionist settlement as another front in the global Jewish threat, blending racial antisemitism with anti-British sentiment. Nazi radio propaganda in Arabic — including broadcasts from Voice of Free Arabism and Radio Berlin’s Arabic service, incited against both Jews and Zionists, fusing racial antisemitism with appeals to Islamic solidarity and Arab nationalism. These broadcasts adapted European conspiracy theories to local audiences, portraying Zionism as British-backed Jewish imperialism threatening the Arab world and Islam itself.
Nazi Germany provided material and diplomatic support during key moments of Arab resistance. In 1941, it backed Rashid Ali al-Gailani’s pro-Axis coup in Iraq, supplying limited arms and propaganda. The most prominent collaborator was Haj Amin al-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a leading figure in the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939 and fierce opponent of Jewish colonization. The Mufti fled to Berlin in 1941. On November 28, 1941, he met Hitler personally. Hitler assured him that Germany’s struggle against the “Jewish home” in Palestine formed part of the broader war against the Jews.
Germany’s objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British power. In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world.
“The sole German objective in the region will be to liquidate all Jews who live in Arab countries under the patronage of Great Britain.”
— Adolf Hitler, November, 28, 1941 (Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945, Series D, vol. XIII)
The Mufti replied that he was not only in full agreement with the Fuhrer regarding the Jewish question, but that the Arabs were the natural friends of Germany and looked forward to the victory of the Axis powers. In the same meeting Hitler stated explicitly that Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews, which naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine, which was nothing other than a center, in the form of a state, for the exercise of destructive influence by Jewish interests. The regime trained Arab exiles, supported anti-British elements, recruited for Muslim Waffen-SS and auxiliary units (including Balkan Muslim divisions in which the Mufti played a role), and explored limited military cooperation in the Middle East. Even as late as 1943–1944, with Axis forces collapsing in North Africa, the Luftwaffe considered proposals to bomb Jewish cities in Palestine (such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv) on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration as a direct strike against Zionism. The Mufti himself broadcast pro-Axis, anti-British, and anti-Jewish/anti-Zionist propaganda via radio to the Arab world and Muslim communities, inciting violence against Jews and the British.
“For 300 years this World Empire was welded together solely by force. War followed war. One nation after another was robbed of its freedom-one state after another was shattered so that the structure which calls itself the British Empire might arise. Democracy was nothing but a mask covering subjugation and the oppression of nations and individuals. … Egyptian Nationalists, Indian Nationalists in their thousands are filling the prisons. Concentration camps were not invented in Germany; it is the English who were the inventors of this idea. By these means they contrived to break the backbone of other nations, to remove their resistance, to wear them down, and make them prepared at last to submit to this British yoke of democracy.”
— Adolf Hitler, January 30, 1941
In April 1941, al-Kaylani masterminded the Golden Square coup, installing himself as prime minister of Iraq and briefly transforming the country into a vivid emblem of Axis-Arab partnership directed against British control. Radio broadcasts from Berlin reinforced this partnership on a daily basis. Iraqi announcer Younis Bahri hosted Arabic programs that famously opened with the stirring greeting “Hail Arabs, This is Berlin.” His messages portrayed the fight against Zionism, British domination, and French colonial rule as a common cause, forging both ideological and emotional links between Nazi Germany and Arab listeners across the region. Yet these were not simply rhetorical gestures. They soon found expression in concrete policy when Hitler issued Führer Directive No. 30 in May 1941, giving explicit support to the Iraqi Arab nationalists led by al-Kaylani in their armed resistance to the British.
“The Arab Independence Movement is our natural ally against England in the Middle East. In this context the uprising in Iraq is of special importance. This strengthens the forces hostile to England in the Middle East beyond the Iraqi frontier, disrupts English communications, and ties up English troops and shipping at the expense of other theaters.”
— Adolf Hitler quoted in Nazi Palestine by K.M. Mallmann and Martin Cüppers
By the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 and the full implementation of the “Final Solution,” any remaining tactical emigration mechanisms, including the Haavara Agreement and limited Revisionist contacts — had been shut down. The Holocaust constituted the total ideological and practical negation of any Jewish national project, whether in Palestine or anywhere else. Nazi propagandists continued to denounce Zionism itself as nothing more than a deceptive front for Jewish global power. In his January 30, 1939 Reichstag speech, Hitler had already made the connection explicit, declaring that a future world war would lead to the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe as the ultimate repudiation of Jewish international influence, including its Zionist form.
Yet even as this policy hardened, the Nazis pursued pragmatic, short-term alliances with Arab forces in the Middle East. In addition to the direct financial support the Palestinians had received from Fascist Italy, the Nazis actively armed them to fight both the Jews and the British. On May 29, 1941, The New York Times carried the headline “Nazis said to arm Palestine Arabs.” Later, in October 1944, the Germans launched Operation Atlas, a concrete expression of the Nazi-Arab partnership. The mission sought to establish an intelligence base in Mandatory Palestine, transmit information back to Berlin, recruit local anti-British Palestinians, and supply them with weapons. Nazi agents were parachuted or infiltrated into the region specifically to cultivate ties with Palestinian leaders and press them to reject any partition of the land between Jews and Arabs.
Conclusions
In the decades since 1945, persistent claims that the Haavara Agreement, limited emigration facilitation, or marginal Revisionist overtures somehow demonstrate brief Nazi “support” for Zionism fundamentally distort the historical record. These episodes represented nothing more than fleeting tactical instruments, tools for accelerating Jewish removal from German soil and extracting economic value — deployed within a worldview that regarded any form of organized Jewish existence, sovereign or otherwise, as an existential racial threat to be neutralized. Far from ideological sympathy, National Socialism viewed Zionism itself as merely another mask for the international Jewish conspiracy, one that had to be confronted and dismantled in all its manifestations.
The absurdity of equating Zionism as a whole with Nazism collapses under even basic scrutiny: one movement represented a desperate effort at Jewish national survival and self-determination in the face of persecution, while the other pursued the biological elimination of Jews as a people. Such comparisons ignore the Nazi regime’s explicit and sustained opposition to any viable Jewish state, treating tactical contacts as proof of alliance while disregarding the overwhelming evidence of hostility.
This stance found concrete expression through unwavering policies: the 1937 Foreign Ministry rejection of the Peel Commission’s Jewish state proposal, the cultivation of the Mufti alliance, Arabic-language propaganda that fused anti-Semitic views with appeals to Arab nationalism, material and diplomatic backing for anti-Zionist revolts and coups, the dismissal of Lehi’s proposals, and the ultimate horror of the Final Solution, which rendered any Jewish national future, Palestine or elsewhere — impossible. Even as some emigration windows briefly existed, the regime’s racial-biological conviction ensured that Zionism was never accommodated but systematically undermined.
With the collapse of the British Mandate in 1948, influence over the region did not vanish but shifted westward; American power more or less inherited and expanded upon the strategic role Britain had played, extending patronage to the new State of Israel amid the emerging Cold War alignments. Nazi Germany, however, had offered no such path. Its legacy remains one of total negation: opportunistic in method at times, yet relentlessly consistent in its determination to erase Jewish influence wherever it appeared.





