The Myth of Nazism as Crony Capitalism

by Zoltanous

The Substack article, Hitler’s Economy: A Case Study of Crony Capitalism by the very retarded classical fascist Joshua Lino, is little more than a tendentious exercise in selective historiography, framing the Third Reich’s economic apparatus as a ramshackle edifice of elite favoritism, unrelenting worker exploitation, statistical chicanery, and inexorable structural decay. Such a portrayal, however, constitutes a deliberate evasion of the regime’s meticulously constructed corporatist socialist paradigm, wherein the state exercised centralized dominion over private enterprises, labor syndicates, and industrial consortia to propel collective national imperatives. By subsuming these disparate elements into a unified, state-orchestrated mechanism, the Nazis supplanted the caprice of laissez-faire markets with deliberate planning that exalted communal objectives above individualistic avarice. The empirical testament to its efficacy is irrefutable: a meteoric ascent from the abyssal ruins of the Great Depression to Germany’s hegemony as Europe’s paramount industrial colossus by 1939, primed for total warfare. This triumph arose not from anarchic cronyism but from a calculated synthesis of socialist collectivism — stressing welfare and redistribution within the “Aryan” Volksgemeinschaft — and corporatist structures that synchronized societal dynamics under unyielding state hegemony. Invoking authoritative scholarly exegeses, the ensuing critique systematically dismantles the post’s contentions, elucidating how the system’s feats in expansion, full employment, and autarkic fortification categorically refute allegations of intrinsic frailty.

Central to the post’s indictment is the claim that unemployment’s precipitous decline was a mere phantasm, engineered via coercive expedients like obligatory labor conscription for males aged 19-24 (subsequently encompassing women by 1939), the sequestration of political foes in camps such as Dachau to excise them from tallies, the “Arbeitsscheu Reich” offensive that coerced “asocial” elements into toil or incarceration, and data distortions that omitted female labor while aggrandizing ephemeral relief initiatives as enduring vocations. It adduces a diminution of roughly 500,000 agrarian posts as symptomatic of profound systemic infirmity — conveniently forgetting that this was deliberate policy under the Reich Food Estate and the Four-Year Plan: low-productivity peasant labor was siphoned into synthetic-fuel plants and armaments factories of far higher strategic yield, while domestic calorie availability per capita for ethnic Germans still rose until 1942 thanks to ruthless extraction mechanisms that would later be perfected in occupied territories.

The Nazis construed economic resuscitation as an adjunct to national mobilization, channeling prodigious state allocations into infrastructural edifices and rearmament to kindle a self-perpetuating vortex of demand and fabrication. This catalyzed a duplication of GDP, escalating from 58 billion Reichsmarks in 1933 to 126 billion by 1939, with the preponderance of late-1930s augmentation propelled by militaristic sectors. Far from consigning agrarian dislocations to net deficits, the apparatus redirected those laborers into paramount domains via systematized reskilling and allocations pursuant to the Four-Year Plan, which accentuated self-reliance in commodities such as coal, iron, and synthetic hydrocarbons. Corporatism, in this context, entailed the stratification of society into interdependent estates — proletarians, agrarians, industrialists — all subordinated to state superintendence, facilitating fluid labor transitions that transmuted inert potential into adjuncts of a consolidated war economy.

Adam Tooze elucidates how this primordial martial alignment fostered enduring occupational proliferation beyond bald compulsion.

“The significance of the Blitzkrieg strategy adopted in 1940–41 was not that it allowed the overall level of mobilization to be kept to a minimum, but that it allowed the German war effort to be split into two parts.”

— Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction

The Autobahn endeavor not only afforded proximate employment to over 80,000 souls but also amalgamated into expansive occupational schemas wherein state-moderated collectives adjudicated remuneration pacts and aptitude distributions, ameliorating inefficiencies stemming from class antagonisms. To redress lacunae in private proficiency, the regime amplified public undertakings exponentially, burgeoning to exceed 500 entities by the early 1940s and duplicating invested capital, thereby guaranteeing steadfast positions in tactical arenas like aeronautics and chemurgy.

“When the regime wanted additional industrial capacity or resources for the military economy which the private sector could not provide, it was created (or conquered) by the state… Government finances for state-owned enterprises rose from RM 4,000m in 1933 to RM 16,000m 10 years later; the capital assets of state-owned industry doubled during the same period; the number of state-owned firms topped 500.”

— Richard Overy, War and Economy In The Third Reich

As rearmament escalated, private ventures were impelled to conform to these imperatives, recalibrating their modalities to fulfill state-dictated benchmarks for yield and occupation. Although labor internment and mandatory enlistment buttressed adherence, they constituted adjuncts to the quintessential apparatus of prescriptive scheming, which by 1938 had efficaciously eradicated unemployment via resource redistribution that eclipsed the haphazard cronyism posited in the post.

“The business community, while willing enough to accept state assistance in reviving exports and supplying credit, was in general wary of the trend to economic interventionism; but by the end of the 1930s the economy was so geared to the priorities of rearmament that private enterprise had little option but to conform.”

— Richard Overy, War and Economy In The Third Reich

The post further delineates labor circumstances as profoundly debased, underscoring obligatory 60-hour industrial regimens (with a seven-hour diurnal threshold in realms like textiles), a 10% diminution in real hourly emoluments from 1931 to 1941 — a figure Lino lifts from Umbach yet neglects to contextualize: once the plunge from full employment to zero income under Weimar is reversed, family allowances and non-wage benefits are added, and the black-market premium on controlled prices is accounted for, average “Aryan” household consumption power still rose 15–20 % between 1933 and 1939 — an 8.5% escalation in subsistence expenditures by 1943 that incited clandestine commerce, mandatory vocation for the senescent and infirm commencing in 1943, and the supplantation of autonomous syndicates with the German Labor Front (DAF), which it depicts as an instrument for employer ascendancy. Citations from Robert Ley are tendentiously deployed to accentuate managerial hegemony, whilst conceptions of syndicalism are derided as groundless. Lino’s cherry-picked Ley quotes — yanked from their context like a hack journalist grasping at straws — reek of desperation, twisting the DAF chief’s words to prop up his crony capitalist delusion while ignoring how they actually mean state-mediated corporatist harmony, not some boss-run racket. Butter, sugar, eggs, and meat did indeed migrate to the black market by the late 1930s, but this was the openly advertised price of guns-over-butter rearmament; the regime compensated with prestige consumption and Strength Through Joy leisure that millions willingly accepted until the war turned sour.

This depiction, nonetheless, neglects the DAF’s pivotal function in corporatist socialism, wherein state mediation reconciled capital and labor to cultivate national fecundity, with leftist vestiges enduring through personages like Ley to Erich Koch, who molded doctrines accentuating communal consonance over class predation. This evolution drew from deeper historical roots in Imperial German industry, where paternalism gave way to a corporatism that prefigured Nazism.

“Of particular importance is the gradual transition in the Saar from a paternalistic workplace to a corporatist factory regime, a change that brought with it an authoritarian vision that ultimately converged with core elements in the ideological discourses of the German radical Right, including the National Socialists.”

— Dennis Sweeney, Work, Race, and The Emergence of Radical Right Corporatism In Imperial Germany

Beneath Ley’s stewardship, the DAF metamorphosed workplaces into amalgamated “factory communes,” where state-designated arbiters interceded in contentions and stipulated stipulations to synchronize with autarkic aspirations, ascertaining that economic yield advantaged the aggregate rather than an entitled cadre. Albeit remunerations persisted stagnant nominally, the regime instituted compensatory stratagems that inculcated socialism: protracted remunerated furloughs (eradicated only after war began — a wartime contingency, not evidence the pre-war model was fake), ubiquitous ingress to economical diversion and salubrity schemes via Strength Through Joy, and a redistribution matrix that funneled martial procurements into communal succor, assuaging the repercussions of protracted durations and apportionment. Feminine assimilation into the proletariat, attaining 37.3% by 1939, was expedited via state inducements that advocated “Aryan” familial bolstering, transfiguring prospective ostracism into inclusive engagement. Clandestine markets indeed materialized from provisioning constrictions, yet they were ancillary to the ampler societal bulwark that tethered denizens to the regime by rendering them immediate recipients of its aggrandizements.

“The economic system of the Third Reich was based on an anti-liberal philosophy that proved extraordinarily effective in bringing about the ‘German Economic Miracle’ by 1937.”

— Avraham Barkai, Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy

Ley, as a principal artificer, preserved leftist party antecedents in this configuration, antecedent proletarian esprit through emoluments that reverberated socialism of parity, even as suppression assailed nonconformists.

To further illuminate Ley’s bona fides as a steward of proletarian upliftment within the corporatist edifice, consider his provenance as a World War I aviator turned chemist who gravitated to the NSDAP in 1924, initially channeling the Strasserite undercurrents that lambasted bourgeois rapacity and championed a transcendent socialism unmoored from Marxist materialism. This ideological ballast informed his orchestration of the DAF as a bulwark against class schism, where he exhorted a paradigm of mutual reverence that elevated operatives from mere drudges to integral cogs in the national ethos, declaring in a 1939 oration that we have rescued the German worker from his weakness as a proletarian creature, all to forge a doubled productivity not for oligarchic plunder but for communal resilience. Ley’s rhetoric perennially underscored this reciprocity, insisting that the factory-community is only then complete when every manager takes his place as an ordinary work-crew member among his crew… no outward distinction between the entrepreneur and the worker existed, thereby transmuting potential antagonism into a symbiotic alliance that infused the labor sphere with an ethos of dignity and shared destiny, far removed from the article’s caricature of unbridled employer tyranny.

“I always say that workers and managers belong together, and we will not leave you alone whether you want us to or not, whether you like it or not. If the manager says: ‘It is ridiculous that I always have to participate in employee meetings, I won’t do it,’ we reply ‘You must do it! Ten thousand workers are marching. The best German blood! It should be an honor for you to march at their head. If you do not want to do that, we will have to put you back in the ranks where the man behind you can tread on your heels until you do it properly. We will teach you, believe me. We will not give up.’”

— Robert Ley, Fate — I Believe!

“In the new Germany, the entrepreneur and worker are no longer enemies but comrades in the same struggle for the welfare of the Volk.”

— Robert Ley, 1935 speech on the DAF’s role in labor harmony

This engendered what equated to a racially discriminatory welfare polity, wherein despoiled assets subsidized ameliorations in existential benchmarks for the preponderance, rebutting the post’s insistence on unmitigated affliction.

“The ideal of the Volksstaat—a state of and for the people—was what we would now call a welfare state for Germans with the proper racial pedigree.”

— Götz Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries

The DAF’s schema additionally incarnated this by ordaining collaborative milieus in manufactories, wherein chieftains and operatives functioned under tenets that elevated national beneficence above private acquisitiveness, perpetuating efficacy sans the market’s turbulence.

“The entrepreneur works in the factory as leader of the enterprise together with the employees and the workers who constitute his followers for the furtherance of the aims of the enterprise and for the common benefit of people and state.”

— Law Regulating National Labor, 20 January 1934,

The post derides endeavors at economic autonomy as inefficacious, accentuating persistent exogenous reliances for 72% of diesel, 55% of gasoline, and 50% of lubricating oil (procured from entities like Standard Oil), the Volkswagen prepayment artifice that diverted 275 million Reichsmarks to martial utilizations sans consummating consumer pledges, gasoline tariffs augmented by 200% via imposts, radio proprietorship quotients at merely 50% juxtaposed to elevated metrics in the UK and US, and holistic existential benchmarks appraised at half those of the US or two-thirds of the UK per Colin Clark’s inquiries — the latter a static 1930s snapshot that ignores the regime’s deliberate prioritization of heavy industry over consumer plenty and the fact that German living-standards had been plummeting since 1929; the relevant metric is the rebound from that abyss, not an absolute Anglo-American comparison. This appraisal disregards the regime’s methodical advancement toward autarky, wherein primordial dependencies were tactically obviated via state-engineered disbursements and consortships.

The New Plan and Four-Year Plan apportioned colossal funds — aggregating 6.4 billion Reichsmarks — to cultivate synthetic surrogates, augmenting indigenous fuel encompassment from 10% to 50% by 1940 and diminishing susceptibility to importations. Corporatist coalitions mandated private concerns to conduce to these ambitions, with state amalgams intervening to administer fabrication and dissemination, ascertaining that economic pursuits ministered to national fortitude rather than ephemeral gains. Ventures like Volkswagen epitomized this binary intent: whilst funds were repurposed for belligerence, the enterprise advocated “people’s artifacts” that rendered commodities more attainable, elevating proprietorship from Depression-era nadirs and evincing the system’s aptitude to interweave consumer succor with tactical precedences under centralized auspices.

Richard Overy delineates the regime’s methodology to assimilating private endeavors into state-propelled autarky.

“Industry was regarded entirely instrumentally by party, state and military, in terms of its ability to provide the sinews of war… The business community was characterized by a defensive opportunism in the face of state power.”

— Richard Overy, War and Economy In The Third Reich

This encompassed normalizing manufacture to diminish expenditures and enhance availability, directly countering existential benchmark censures by concentrating on comparative accretions from the 1930s datum.

“The Third Reich made it its mission to use the authority of the state to coordinate efforts within industry to devise standardized and simplified versions of key consumer commodities. These would then be produced at the lowest possible price, enabling the German population to achieve an immediate breakthrough to a higher standard of living.”

— Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction

By 1939, state proprietorship had burgeoned to one-fifth of aggregate capital, underscoring the transition toward augmented dominion that capacitated these progressions.

MEFO instruments are censured as mendacious debt obfuscation that precipitated 1938 scarcities, necessitating impost augmentations on corporations and excises in 1938 and revenues in 1939, whilst purportedly insulating the patriciate (with the apex 1% revenue portion ascending 45% to 16.3 %, abetted by dispensations like the “Lex Krupp” that preserved 400 million Reichsmarks) — numbers drawn from incomplete 1938 tax-return data that ignore forced loans, party “donations,” and the redistribution of Aryanized Jewish assets; once those are factored in, the effective concentration of disposable wealth at the very top actually declined. The post additionally remarks ponderous civilian excise encumbrances, a 30% declension in veritable consumption by 1944, delusive emolument constancy, banks encumbered with nugatory debentures, and equity valuations bisected to subsidize the state. Verily, MEFO operated as an ingenious corporatist contrivance, expediting armaments disbursements at 17% of GNP by 1938 sans igniting inflation, whilst ascertaining profits were recirculated in collective pursuits.

The system’s fiscal machinations incorporated socialist reallocation, employing despoilments and directed funds to furnish ubiquitous advantages that tethered the populace to expansionist doctrines, with patricians contributing via obligatory expedients notwithstanding sporadic fealty-based exemptions.

“It may have taken different forms in different countries, but the ultimate destination of the revenues generated was always the German war chest. These funds enabled the Reich to defray its main financial burdens.”

— Götz Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries

This paralleled scheming in other directive economies, reorganizing industries for state preeminence.

“One final point of similarity between Nazi and Soviet policies should be noted… Both governments reorganized industry into larger units, ostensibly to increase state control over economic activity.”

— Peter Temin, Soviet and Nazi Economic Planning In The 1930s

Primordial privatizations were ostensible and inverted in praxis, favoring regime-congruent dominion.

“It is a fact that the government of the Nazi Party sold off public ownership in several State-owned firms in the mid-1930s… However, the general orientation of the Nazi economic policy was the opposite of contemporary privatization policies.”

— Germà Bel, Against the Mainstream: Nazi Privatization In 1930s Germany

The article depicts post-1938 reliance on Soviet importations from sundry global provenances, averments that provisions were “only possible with Russia” from 1938 to 1941, abortive exogenous investments, and degenerating relations as testimony of ineptitude. These dispositions were, however, tactical interstices in a corporatist commerce doctrine, wherein state-dominated cartels procured 92% of indispensable materials by 1937, augmented by synthetics to attenuate holistic exogenous exigencies. Relations atrophied owing to elemental ideological schisms, not doctrinal lapses, as the apparatus primed for procurement via aggrandizement to attain veritable independence.

Reprivatizations of holdings like VESTAG in 1936, banks in 1937, and 85% of Reichswerke in 1942, conjointly with the Bond Stock Act, are proffered as capitalist recidivisms, with MEFO buttressed by private entities, oil domains under international sway, and the socialism designation repudiated due to syndicate dissolution and racially circumscribed succor. These maneuvers were illusory, as corporatism preserved state paramountcy via regulatory mechanisms and amalgams, efficaciously socializing fabrication sans formal appropriations. Succor, albeit exclusionary, functioned on collectivist trajectories, apportioning advantages to nurture fealty amid the designated commune.

“The nationalization of big industry was never attempted after the Nazis came into power… The socialization of the entire German productive machinery… was achieved by methods other than expropriation, to a much larger extent.”

— Gustav Stolper, German Economy, 1870–1940

Such conveyances frequently advantaged adherents, as evinced in the United Steel reconfiguration for Fritz Thyssen.

“Soon after the Nazi party came to power, United Steel was reorganized so that the government majority stake of 52 percent was converted into a stake of less than 25 percent… Fritz Thyssen… had been one of only two big industrialists to give support to the Nazi Party before it.”

— Germà Bel, Against The Mainstream: Nazi Privatization In 1930s Germany

The post’s peroration configures the economy as belligerence-dependent, intrinsically volatile, and fated to “implode from day one,” designating it a “desperate, backwards and bureaucratic cult” predicated on Norbert Räth’s allusion to the armaments surge. This repudiates the incontrovertible pre-war attainments: a corporatist socialism that reconstructed from economic dissolution into a juggernaut competent of perpetuating protracted total war, solely unraveled by hyper distension rather than endogenous blemishes.

“The outcome [of the Nazi economy] was a command economy, governed by military priorities, but run by a coalition of state officials, soldiers, party hacks and industrial technocrats.”

— Richard Overy, War and Economy In The Third Reich

This command structure, far from a haphazard cronyist patchwork, embodied the essence of corporatism as a deliberate Third Position ideology — neither pure liberalism nor communism, but a state-orchestrated Gleichschaltung. As elucidated in Corporatism and The Ghost of The Third Way by Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, published in Capitalism and Society, corporatism arose in the late 19th century from Anti-Cartesian French intellectuals and Roman Catholic social teachings, such as the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno. This paradigm put the state’s police power behind officially sanctioned Corporations — elite-controlled industrial cartels empowered to set wages, prices, employment, quotas, regulate entry, and limit imports — to end class struggle by guaranteeing workers’ accustomed jobs and incomes through a “principle of subsidiarity” that devolved authority downward while preserving elite oversight.

Morck and Yeung’s analysis validates this by detailing how Nazi Germany explicitly adopted corporatism: partitioning the economy into twenty-eight employer-employee industry Corporations under the Reich Economy Ministry, which wielded powers to suspend new enterprises, fix capacities, and compel fusions “in the interests of the enterprises, of production as a whole, and of the community” citing Daniel Guérin, Fascism and Big Business. This extended party control through forced labor allocation, import/export licenses, price enforcement by brown shirts, and Reichsbank dominance over savings to subsidize loyal firms — rejecting liberalism in favor of the state. Echoing Catholic anti-individualism, Hitler’s rhetoric emphasized subordinating the ego to the community in Mein Kampf, aligning with the regime’s mystical pageantry akin to religious rituals in Eric Voegelin’s Die Politischen Religionen. Morck and Yeung further draw on John Weitz, Hitler’s Banker, and Maxine and Bernard Yaple Sweezy Woolston, The Structure of the Nazi Economy, to underscore the corporatist framework’s deliberate design for command and collectivism.

By linking Nazi economics to broader corporatist legacies — causing mid-20th-century “Great Reversals” in financial development in Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales view and entrenching anti-competitive institutions in Catholic-majority or French-influenced countries—Morck and Yeung refute claims of “intrinsic frailty” or cronyism, instead portraying a calculated system of socialist redistribution within a racially exclusive Volksgemeinschaft, synchronized by state hegemony over private entities. They highlight innovations like universal banks delegating anonymous shareholders’ votes to Reich-controlled institutions via Caroline Fohlin, Corporations were mandated to serve stakeholders (especially the Reich) over shareholders, thus freeing directors from profit imperatives and enshrining “an utter rejection of liberal individualism” as Dan Silverman argued in Hitler’s Economy.

Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung say that:

“The 1937 law further proclaimed the Führerprinzip, the principle that a corporation should be run not for its shareholders, but for all its stakeholders – especially the Reich and Führer. This not only enshrined an utter rejection of liberal individualism, but freed Party-appointed directors of narrow shareholder concerns like profits.”

— Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, Corporatism and The Ghost of The Third Way

By framing the Nazi system as a purposeful corporatist socialist model — complete with state-enforced cartels, rejection of market individualism, and hierarchical harmony — it exposes Lino’s “crony capitalism” label as a mischaracterization that ignores the regime’s ideological roots and structured collectivism, reducing his portrayal to an evasion of the Nazis’ intentional use of corporatism for national imperatives, not mere elite favoritism.

The Nazi corporate state diagram

To further illustrate this corporatist edifice, consider the schematic blueprint of the National Socialist Corporate State, or “Ständestaat,” which encapsulated the regime’s economic model in a hierarchical pyramid of state-supervised estates. At its apex stands the Führer, embodying the dictatorial Führerprinzip, from which authority cascades through Hitler’s Council and key Reich Ministries (Labour and Economics) to unify disparate sectors under centralized dominion. The DAF occupies a pivotal node, integrating workers into “occupational communities,” blocks, and cells — elective in name but appointed by the state — to foster “faithful comradeship” and suppress class strife, as per the Factory Code’s mandate of “common weal before private gain.” Below, 18 sectoral corporations (agriculture, chemicals, transport) and Reich Groups (industry, energy, banking) form interdependent cartels, regulated by economic chambers, honor courts, and labour trustees to enforce wages, quotas, and production aligned with national imperatives like autarky and rearmament.

This structure, partitioning the economy into twenty-eight employer-employee corporations under the Reich Economy Ministry (as Morck and Yeung detail, citing Daniel Guérin), wielded powers to suspend enterprises, fix capacities, and compel fusions as a whole. It rejected liberalism, subordinating private entities to stakeholder priorities — especially the Reich — via innovations like the 1937 Aktiengesetz, which proclaimed directors free from profit imperatives in service to the Volksgemeinschaft.

The Ständestaat did not merely borrow — it devoured and racialized Engelbert Dollfuss’s Austrofascist corporatism. That regime had already weaponized Catholic social doctrine, above all Quadragesimo Anno, to liquidate class struggle through a hierarchical “corporate state” of state-backed guilds and subsidiarity, proudly scorning liberal markets for estates ordained by God and Fatherland. Upon Anschluss, the Reich gutted the Christian veneer and reforged the apparatus: Austrofascist trade unions were swallowed into the DAF’s “one big union,” sectoral corporations were hardened into wartime instruments — the same structures that would later mutate into post-war social corporatism aka the Nordic Model. As the foremost scholars of the era, Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka proved this.

This is no patchwork of cronyism for the boys in brown. This is the anti-capitalist, anti-communist “Third Way” perfected: a meticulously engineered machine of socialist redistribution, racially gated, synchronized by the iron fist of the state. Lino’s “crony capitalism” fable dies here, asphyxiated by the historical record.

“Nazi political hegemony in the end prevented German capitalists from acting as capitalists.”

— Richard Overy, War and Economy In The Third Reich

Lino’s crony capitalist lens aligns with a broader misreading — echoed in Frankfurt School critiques framing fascism as monopoly capital under state guise, or modern left analyses depicting it as “hypercapitalism” with Social Darwinist edges. If Lino seeks a true exemplar of crony capitalism’s defects — replete with revolving doors, bailouts, and elite favoritism — he’d do better to pivot from Berlin to Rome. Mussolini’s Italy began with laissez-faire too, slashing taxes and regulations to court business elites like Fiat’s Giovanni Agnelli, who rotated seamlessly between private empires and state roles in a classic revolving door. This “honeymoon” soured into “divorce” by the late 1930s: massive state bailouts through the IRI rescued floundering cartels at the cost of autonomy, breeding inefficiency, and corruption. In contrast, Nazi Germany’s corporatism was far more ideologically rigid and centrally orchestrated — business was subordinated to national-racial imperatives with far less room for the opportunistic favoritism that plagued Italy’s consorzi and mixed entities. Italy flirted with cronyism’s vices and only repudiated it during the 1943 Social Republic; Germany’s actually worked until it was shattered by overextension.

With that, every single feeble attempt Lino fired at Nazism in his revisionist and amateurish post has been not just caught, but dissected, demolished, and hurled back with interest — leaving his crony capitalist fantasy in tatters, exposed as the lie it truly is. Let him know I nuked his post on his video!

Part 2 to this article:

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